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2 THE ATTACK AXD DEFESCE OF FLEETS. 
THE ATTACK AND DEFEKCE OF FLEETS. 
l ' . \ T X  11. 
By Captain I?. H. COT.OJIL:, R.K. 
J[WH of the neglect under n-liicli m y  subject undoubtedly lies, may 
proceed from an idea which imprcsscd mc rery strongly a t  ono time, 
namely, that tlie attack or defenco of a. modern fleet c:iunot bc profit- 
ably studied prior to thc cxpcricnce of ninny actual combats. It seems 
at fiist sight probablc that no such thing as rulo or law can be crolretl 
csccpt from the facts of cxpcriment in war. It is thercforc readily 
assumed that naval stmtcgy is not yet in a condition to bc madc n sub- 
jcct of study. This lino of thouglit would bo excusablo after many 
failures to discover the hidden lam or laws which may exist, but it does 
not excuse tlio neglect to seek for thcm. We liavc no business to mako 
the assumption in tho first place, for it is foundcd on no data; and, 
moreover, I trust to have shewn in formcr papers thnt so far from being 
tho mguo conglomcratc of conflicting opinion generally supposcd, a 
v e r y  superficial analysis recorcrs many points of absoluto certainty 
round which theories may snfely rcvolrc, or, a t  tlic r e l y  lcast, gives 
encouragement to perscvcrc. 
The first 
is vcry casy, wry common, and wry inisleading. Thc second is slow, 
troublesome, rare, but may lead us to tho ccry ccntro of tho maze. Tho 
first is the empirical or ratiocinatire method-the sccond, thc induc- 
tivc. Tho first nssumcs somc tlicoi-j- of attack and dcfencc, somo pet 
formation, or fnrouritc meapon, and argues to t t c  particulars of D coni- 
bat foundcd on thcsc assumptions. The lattcr assumes nothing nt the 
ontsot. It cstablislics particulars by observation and experiment, and 
thcn collates, or  colligatcs, as it lias been callccl, tliese particulars, until 
it weaves thcm into general harmony. Thc former mctliod way turn 
out a truth in tho samc way as you may tlirow sixes with dicc. Tlic 
lattcr method may bc less brilliant, but what it establishes is rcliablc, 
and in any case such errors as occur, arc capablo of detection bcforc tlio 
general result comes to bo applied in x-ar, for thcy must bo causcci either 
by somc mistaken particular, or by sonic wrong application of particu- 
lars mliich arc in themselves truc. 
I need not say whicli of tlic tn-0 methods has my a p p r o d ,  or on 
whicli of them I intcnd to bascmy present cnquirj-. N y  former paper" 
sufficiently slicwcd tliat I T V ~ S  content to makc any sacrifice rather than 
proceed to gcneralisc liastily. n u t  in applying such particulars ns I 
assumcd to be established whcn I last addrcsscd you, I must ask yon 
to bear in mind that'thcy nro assumptions still, in a grcater or  less 
ilcgrcc. Thcro is not ono of tho points tlicn adverted to wliich \ d l n o t  
bear-nay, mhicli docs not impcratircly dcmand-rcctificntion by ob- 
servation and expcrimcnt. I deny absolutely that IX can form any 
* Sce Joiirnd, rol. sr, p q o  40S, ct  seq.-ED. 
Thcro arc, howcvcr, tvro ways of approachig the study. 
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TUG nTTlCli  Ah'D 'DEFENCE OF FLEETS, 3 
correct notion of what a future n a r d  action mill bo from tho colligation 
ofcircumstances wliicli 11-0 do not know absolutely to bc Cicts. At  tho 
samc timo I hold in good faith to thc tlieory t h t  if KC h e m  accu- 
ratcly a11 tho fwts which can bo cstablislietl by cspcrimcnt and obser- 
Tation in peaco time, wc should hare materials amply sufficient to 
guido us to complete success on tho first occasion of putting our tlicory 
into practicc against an enemy. 
Thcsc rcmarks arc not unnecessary at  the outset of my paper. Therc 
is iiot 0110 of us n a r d  Officers mlio has not either lreard or csprcssc? 
the most decided opinions on tlie efficiency of certain formations and 
tho incflicicncy of others; yet I rcnturc to say not 10 per cent. of us 
hare ever licard any good reasons as to mliy ono formation is better 
than another, and not 2 pcr cent. liarc crcr thought out tlic matter 
oven superficially for  themselves. Tho danger we run of committing 
ourselrcs to some definite theory of attack and defenco without any in- 
ductivo steps leading up to it, is real and tangible; and if, instead of 
ndvocnting a particular ric\v, it should come to pass t h t  I show the 
cnrl farther off than crer, and leave your minds open 02 tlrc questions, 
I shall-not consider I liaro dono bad scrJ-icc. 
I must now advert to an oppositc opinion on this matter which is 
held by men of greater practical cspcricnco than my own, and of 
dcserredly greater weight. It is very strongly lield by tlieso that it is 
far moro important to harry n plan than to haw n good plan of attack 
or defence. It is insisted that tho Admiralty would be visc now, with 
our prcsent information, in deciding on n particular formation and mode 
of attack, and in enforcing its use on oui*ddmirals, so far as escluding 
nll other plans from tho Signal Book goes. The issuc raised is very 
distinct, but it is not one I am called on to a r p o  here. For, if I bc 
wrong in supposing n bad compulsory plan to bc worse than no plan, 
still, as no plan is yet adopted, such investigntions as mino go to esta- 
blish not only a plan, but, if properly conducted, a good plan, oren 
though, ns I before remarked, tho attainmont of one wcro so far 
Off. 
It is now incumbent on mo to statc what tlio aim of my arguments 
will be. 
I understand tlio GUCCCSS of a fleet action will depend jointly or serer. 
ally on four things, namely, material superiority, moral supcriority, 
superior mobility, and superior position. 
If wc ham it, and 
an equality in the other three things, \TO shall win without n discus- 
sion. 3Iora1 superiority is often confounded witli strategy, and often 
spoken of as though it xero a possession not only esclusivcly English, 
but incompatiblewith strategic skill or eren strategic plans. I hope I 
should bo tlie last to despiso that fire, dash, and stolid dctermin a t' ion 
irhich hurled a Nelson on tlrc t a n  of tlic French n t  the Xile, and on 
tho head of the Xole a t  Sants Cruz. I trust no English naval 
Officer ~ l l  over forget that, guns or no guns, rams or no rams, torpe- 
does or no torpedoes, lic mlio places himself most complctcly in tho 
spirit of Nelson's orders to his Captains is doing the best sert<ec to 
the State, and runs most cliarico of winning. If neme gained naval 
Matorial supcriority wc h a ~ o  notliing to do with. 
B ?  
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4 THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF FLEETS. 
victories for us n centnry ago, surely those ~ 1 1 0  linvc it in snpcriority 
possess an increased power now! But the instances I quoted of 
Nelson a t  the Nile and Xelson a t  Santn C1.u~ arc sufficient to indicatc 
that bravery and stratcog combincd arc  cry mncli more powxful than 
bravery alone. Tho bmvc mm liad bcttcr be intelligently bravo wvliilc 
110 is about it. It mayrnisc his rcpntation for pluck to win with great 
loss, but it will benefit tho State more that lie diould win with small 
loss. Bcsidcs, n man cannot bc argued into bravcry, nnd he can bc 
taught stratcg.  
Again, mobility in  R flcct must bc attained before the latter can be 
stratcgieally cmplojcd. I pre-suppose wc liarc it in equality ninth tlic 
otlier side. Of tho four qualities set out there remains now only the 
Inst-superiority of position. What constitutes it and horn to p i n  it, 
is thc subject I intend to discuss. 
To those, therefore, and they arc many, who pin their faith on tlic 
morn1 snpcriority given by aurlacitr and nerve, and propose without 
a y  plan to rush upon an enemy’s fleet and frighten him into submis- 
sion, I linve nothing to snr of n controversial character. I am not 
about to argue mlicther audacity bc n grcatcr or n less powxful 
weapon than skill. But I am about to argue, and do maintain, that 
audacity snpplcmcnted by skill is irresistible, and my objcct is to 
arrive at sonic conclusion as to 1 1 0 ~  your own Flcct ‘can bo best dis- 
posed so ns to nllow your audacity to produce tho greatest possible 
effect on your enemy Tritli tho lcast harm to joiirself. 
. I must now Ret oat in ordcr thoso points which, discussed in my 
last paper, or generally admitted, liave, for the purposes of my present 
argumcnt, all tho forco of f&s, and must bc acknowlcdgcd as such 
until they arc controverted. 
First comes tho possible spccd of a flcct in action : we know that 
this nnges bctn-ccn, say, ci+t and thirteen knots, and if I take a mean 
of tcn knots, I shall plnco myself in such n position that half ins 
licarcrs will say I put it too liigli, and the othcr half too low, R SUB- 
cicnt gunranteo for being somowhero nrar tho trutli. Assuming 
such a speed, enables me to deal with tlic all-important relations d 
timc and spacc ; will pcrmit mo to shorn what can and what cannot bc 
donb by a fleet in the time a l l o i d  j and how tho skilful commander 
may avail himself of tho limit which time imposes on his enemy’s 
movements. 
Next comes tho turning power of ships, mliich I showed in my last 
and former papers emnot bo taken as to spacc, at n smnllcr arc than 
one with n radius of two and a-half times tho ship’s length ; and as to 
time, a reduction in speed over tlio arc of one-third. It is perhaps 
necessary to rcpent here that this statement does rcpresent i n  tlic 
rough an absolute fact; and that thc figures do give tho smallest space 
combined with tho least timc in which average ships can turn. If tlic 
spacc be diminished the time will bc increased, and if thc spacc be in- 
C ~ C R S C ~ ,  so also will tho time. 
If IYC nom tako 300 feet as tlic length of an ordinary ironclad, IYC 
get an arc of turning for the ships of our fleet of 250 yards, and n 
timc of turning through (say) eight points nt tcii knots, of two minutes. 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 A
uc
kla
nd
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 1
9:3
0 0
2 M
arc
h 2
01
5 
THE Sl?TACIC AND DEFENCE OF FLEETS. 5 
1 luust dram your particular attention to tho foregoing figures, 
bccausc I basc my ~rholc ricw of n a r d  strategy upon them, not 
indeed on tho cract numbers, but upon thcir relations to each other. 
TI~CSC rclations arc, in my Tic\\-, tlic bounds within mhicli the strategist 
,uust work, and beyond mliich hc mill, only fail in ottcmpting to pass. 
I t  is no use to call them mattcrs of detail or assumptions, they arc 
vital principles; and the only assumption about them is the exactness 
of the figures. Ships may not bc 300 feet in length, but tlic shortest 
turning ironclad which has crcr been built, going a t  Iier highest speed, 
takes about n minute to turn through tight points on nn arc mhosc 
cliametcr was 5.2 times licr length, reducing her s p e d  oTer tlic arc by 
1Il01-c than one-tenth. 
I laid it 
C1ou-n last year from thc best data obtainable, tliat only about 10 pcr 
cent. of tlic shot fircd from n sen-going ship m-ould takc effect upon 
:inother broadside-on, and a t  n fired distance of 1,000 yards; and 
that tlic highest spccd of firc which could bc calculated on, was about 
oiic round in t h e  minutes. Tho damage donc by hits a t  that range 
was of conrsc not easy to estimate, but esccpt a t  close quarters, whcn 
the shot strikc fair on the broadside, all allow it to bc small: thc 
c i b t  of hits received when end-on is generally considcrcd to bo ~ i l .  
I bcld thc ixm to bc tlic effcctivc weapon in a single-ship action, the 
gun bciiig subordinate, unless the Harvey torpedo should supersede 
the former; and wliilc on this subject, I must ~a.zp two words. I hayo 
usually in my papers stated that thc idea of thc ram :originated in our 
Service, with itlie gallant Admiral of tho Flcct, Sir George Sartorins. 
Hc \\-ill bc pleased to know tliat another Officer, Sir James Sulivan, 
was, contemporaneously with him, pressing tlic wcapon on thc noticc 
of the Gorcmmcnt, and assisting in that dcvclopment which 11-c are yet, 
so far from seeing coniplctc. 
Again, I haTc secn, since I last addressed you, tlic Hnrrcy torpcdo 
in action, and I have modified iny v i c ~ s  of it. It is not, in my 
opinion, so po\rcrful n weapon as I formerly bclicvcd it to be. To use 
it effectually, special ships of high speed must bc cmploycd, and cl-en 
then, much.morc skill is required than 1 imagined necessary. It seems 
to me also, that thc mitrailleuso or T-olIeF-gun will bc a very effectirc 
defencc against this torpedo. T t  would bc used both to sivecp the 
iiianipulntors off tlic decks, and also to destroy thc torpcdo itself. In 
uug case, it must hero bc said that cvcn when I read my last p~pcr, I 
could not \ICW the Har~cy torlwdo :is nu effective weapon in fleets. 
It is trac tliat oiie or two special ships towing torpedocs, might, as an 
ctcarit gnrde, tlirow a hostile flect into somc confusioii; but, as tlic 
cneniy might eqwdly i d 1  employ thc samc wcapon, IVC slioulcl ham a 
combat of torpedo vessels batwen tho fleets before they met, which 
could not lead to  decisivc rcsiilts. If this torpedo is cver rendered 
powcrlcss against friends, fleets might emplor it with greatcr reliance 
on its power, against enemies. 
I now arrirc at D point on which them is not, and cannot bc an1 
data, but mliicli univeisal assent has established as n fact. I allude t o  
the general understanding that whntcrcr forniations may l c  in futurc 
Tlic ncst point to bc considcrcd is tlic gun-power of ships. 
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6 TllC ATTACK AKD DEFESCE OF FLEETS. 
assumcd by two hostile fleets in action, tlic ships composing tlicm will 
alwajs be end-on, and never broadside-ou to the cncmj. Some cs- 
planation is rcqnircd to slicm IIOW I look on it. 
In  my last paper I cndcnrourcd to shew that, prevalent as the notion 
was that the end-on position was that which a ram ~vould assume to- 
~vards nnothcr sliip in action, it was in reality a false one. I showed 
that this was quite a right position for a ship ?tot herself D ram, and 
desirous to avoid bcing rammed, but that if a rani XS-CIY! so to rango 
lierself slic could never strike a t  an adrantage. I find now very many 
05cers liolil that I am wrong, not in upholding tho advantage of 
making your stern takc j o u r  cncmfs broadside, but wrong in bclicving 
that two ships will scldom, or  never, meet stem to stem. It is difficult 
to arguc either sidc of thc question, but I may notc that tLc Russian 
gunboats ncvcr mct stcm to stem in thcir cspcrimcnts; and I may 
cxpress my firm belief that one or other ship mill in such n, case swerve 
a t  thc last moment, and pass broadside to broadside without any rcsult 
from either ram. Those who think othcrmisc must remember that 
thcrc is no analogy bctmcen the old principle of getting broadside-on to 
Four cncmy at pistol rangc, and pounding him till either one or tlio 
other struck, and the stcm-to-stem encounter betwccn two rams. The 
superiority of the English seaman in our old wars  la^ in his muscle and 
liis stcadiness. The wxb-ness of OUP cncmics was nevcr in material, 
but thcy failed in nerve and stolidity. It mas tlic height of strategy 
to bring our strong points against his weak ones, and I~roadside to 
broadside did this in pcrfection. But for one ship to run against 
anothcr, stem-to-stem, is no strategy, but rather a reckless blind trust- 
ing to chance. 
Thc victory depends upon mliich ship turns out to be hardcst, and 
tlic spinning of a tectotum \ d l  represent the cliances OII citlier sidc. 
Thc strong probability is that if two ships met at speed, stem-to-stem, 
the shock would bc so tcrrific that both combatants would instantlF 
disappear. 
I am saying nothing liere of tlic policy of charging straight down 
upon your cncmy in the bcIicf that lie will flinch fi-om his end-on 
position before the last moment, aud givc sou the opportunity you 
sc,ek. Such n couisc may be tho most crccllent strategj, as IOU arc 
opposing yonr prcsnmcd strength of ncrrc to your enemy's weakness. 
I have bcforc said, however; tlint I liavc notliing to do with strategy 
of this kind, and if a stem-to-stcm encounter is contcmplatcd in any 
other view, it i d ,  I tliink, be a w r y  fbolisli procccding. 
I f  there is anything to be Faid on tlic other sidc, I am not now 
a-arc of it, and I therefore bas0 all my idms on what I haw lierc 
stated. 
Tliosc, tlicrcforc, tvlio tliink with nic, will observe tlic instinct of tho 
naval tsorld has led .it to coiltemplate thc end-on position for hostilo 
fleets, not as tlic bcst means of attacking iritli imis, but as tlio bcst 
means of frustinting an :ittack of ixms. Our opponents will takc tho 
opposite ~ c w .  Thc lnttcr party will maintain that the ram dominntcs 
and prescribes tlic formation, and is itself the chief wcapon; I, on the 
contrary, concludc that thc inm dominates nud'prescribcs the formation 
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THE ATTACK Ah’D DEFESCE OF FLEETS. 7 
\qhicIi is SO good o.defence against it, that the rani is not tl?c chief 
,reapon in fleet actions. And tlic inefficiency of the ram as tho chief 
fleet weapon, once the end-on position is firmly established, seems to 
me to be argued by otlier considerations which T hare not yet seen 
treated bs any writer on tactics. 
If we examine the ramming tactics for singlo ships laid out in m-~- 
1 s t  paper, and endeaFour to apply tlicni to fleets, we shall soon see, 1 
think, their inapplicability. Take Diagram I, figs. 7 and 8, and Dia- 
Ll -ram IIT, fig. 1, of p y  former paper, and you wdl at onccnotc that the 
Y 1 
mode of approach is of small raluc. If z and y, Figs. 7 and 8, iyeru 
leaders of single columns in line ahead, as in Diagram IS‘, fig. 1, it is 
apparent either that the leaders alone would encountcr, or that tho turn 
of R: to ram, throning lier broadside open to tho nest astcrn of y, would 
he taken advantage of by that ship, and ownif z succeeded inramming 
y, she would herself be rammed in turn. So if R: and y mere the port wing 
sliips of single lines abrfiist, as in Dingnm IT, fig. -0, tlrcir manmuvrcs 
would limo no refcrcncc to tho remainder of tlic flect. I f  w and y wvero 
not wing ships, but somo ot lm ships in the lines abreast; as in Dix- 
cram V, fig. -1, then s must make lris turn astcrn of his Icft hand 
Geig~ibour; 110 l a p  Gmsclf open to attack by y’s left hand neighhour, 
nnd breaks the order of his own line, cutting himself off from support 
a t  the same time. Siiould lie, lio\\-evcr, use tlic short turn, as in Din- 
gram V, fig. 2. his manoxivre will be baulkcd by his own left hand 
nciglibour, to nroid whom Iic must escrcisc caution, and who moro or 
less Iiidcs tlic object of liis attack, just  at the moment wlicn a11 depends 
on his getting n clear iiow. Heasqiii lays liimself open to the nttackof 
2/’s left hand ncighbour, or, if 110 misses y, of lris right hand nciglibour. 
If x and y, liowevci; being lcadcrs of lines ahcad, clioosc tlie 4-point 
method of npproneli gircn in Diagram III, fig. 1, tlic rest of the fleet 
h s  not partake in any of tlic advantages of the modc of ndvnncc, as 
limy be seen from Diagram Tr, fig. 3. If, lio\~-evcr, they were the 
leaders of columns in quarter-line, ns in Fig. ‘$, their tactics wvould 
cqually applx to thc ships nstcrn of them. But tlic cliffcrcncc is, that 
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8 *rnI: ATTICK ASD UI:FESCI.: OF FLECTS. 
3: is no longer solcly occupied with liis attack. If liis o\vn next 
astern by any accident dets y’s ncxt astcrn slip past him, z ]ins two 
ships upon him, and fights a t  a disadvantagc. We scc running tlirough 
all thcse positions a principle by ~diicli, in formation, ono ship cowxs or 
guards anothcr from a ramming attack, and rcndcrs uselcss the mcthods 
which arc available between single ships. Tlic flcet which rigidly 
maintains its cnd-on position, and whose ships only ’sn-errc from that 
to dclivcr their blow upon the cnemy, who pxscnts his broadside wdiilc 
attempting to rain the sliips to  whom they arc guar+, goes into action 
witli an advantage, for it runs no sucli risks of being rammed as its 
opponents who seek to attack in that manner, and while it ncrcr clrops 
its own guard, it is ready to tdic advantage of any slip its enemy 
may makc. 
Naval stintegy, therefore, while it dictates an attack by the rani by 
single ships as tlio most cffcctiw mcaus of obtaining tlic I-ietorx fol* 
him who is most skilful, docs not seem to me to advise that policy iii a 
jlcet attack. You must bcat your cnemy in some otlicr way. 
Before leaviry this part of my subjcct, i t  is ncccssary to point out 
that some ships in cvcry formation lia-ie no guards, and are open to tlio 
same attack as singlc slips. The mar ships in linc ahcad are OllCu to 
the ramming attack on both sidcs; and tlic wing sliips in lines abreast 
and quarter lines were open to attack 011 tlicir ontcr sidcs. Hence, 
although you cannot, as it sceins to me, make your general cffort a 
lamming attack, you will bc foolisli to avoid any opportunity xliicli 
offers of attaching pwticular parts of your enemy in that, manqc~. 
W e  arc now in :L condition to apply tlic prineiplcs we liave brought 
nut to tlic actual business of my paper, the Attack and Defence of 
Fleets. 
In  all sea-fights of formcr ages, we scc cithel. of t.wo conditions ; both 
flects equally ready for the combat, or one assuming from tho outset 
the attack, and the other the defence ; the former condition is mrc. 
Hitherto, I beliere, no case lias occurred wlicrc-as in so many battles 
on land-a skilful movement lias converted tlic defence into an attack. 
The most that could bc done in formcr timcs was pmctiscd by tlio 
Frcnch, befoiu! tlic revolutionary mu-, in taking advantage of the 
meaknebs of the Qritish attack to damage them seriously while kcepiiig 
themselves out of liarm’s wax. Clcrk of Eldin slicn-s that in tlic attack 
from to 1)-indward, gcncmll~ practised by us bcforc Loid Rodney’s 
victory changcd our vic~-is, we really offcrcd a portion of our ficcts to 
thc whole fire of the cncmy, ns  shcwti in Diagiani V, lig. 5,  and tlic 
van bccoining disalcd from. this causc, tlic Frcncli were in a position 
to bcnr aw:~y to leeward Lto re-form, and to rcpcat tlic nianccunc, 
which they usually did.’ 
Sir Jolin Jnrvis at  St. Vincent, and Lord Kelson a t  tlic Kilc, :ire 
brilliant examples of an oppositc mode of proceeding, a i d  thougli tlic 
approach of Lord Xclson a t  Tinfalgar might scem :I rccurrcncc to old 
methods, it ivas not really so, as the cncmfs fire u-aq diridcd betmeen 
two mns, and the approach \\-as direct, and as rapid as it could bc, 
instead of the slow and “ IasL5ng” approacli, as it was called, slicwn iii 
Fig. 5, DingmmV. 
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TIIf: ATTACK A S D  1)CZ‘IXCE OF FLEWS. 9 
1x1 the changed condition of things now, we must be rcry careful to 
,.,uard against following history too blindly as our guide ; but, at  tlie 
time, we must by no means neglect to arail oursclws of tIic 
lessens she really teaclies j though, therefore, the nzuizner has passed 
llwy, the mztter remains as worthy of adoption as el-er it. was. 
I think now that Steam has done much to alter the former state of 
&iirs, and that an inferior fleet miy, when direct attack is not 
nt first attempted, conrert n defence into an attack, and perhaps cveu 
TIX principles of a skilful attack or defence must ever remain tlic 
game ; they must alnaj-s be tlic offering n superior force to an inferior ; 
and if R part of the cncmfs fleet is made to bcar the brunt of tlic 
\\-hole of Four ovn, tho greatest strategist can do no more. 
I am sorry, hon-ever, to beliere that we arc a t  present dnwiiig 
11iore inspiration from the manner of o u r  forcfatlicrs in naval tactics 
than from the matter. I do not think we have sliakcn ourselves suffi- 
ciently clear of tlic traditions of naval scn fights to pcrcciyc tlie l a ~ r s  
which underlie them, and become applicable to our own times. 111 
days of yore vie hid n broadside position ; small sail ; and IOU* speed. 
 em KC llarc the end-on position, and p a t  spcejl. I do not tliink, from 
1111 I have seen and Iieard, that naval minds liabituall~ d \~e l l  on .the 
6 p C C d  a t  which future actions must be fought. It is known and ncknou-- 
]edged that a ship without speed, if met by a ship with speed, is 
doomcd to certain destruction by ramming, but in spitc of this, the 
picturc of a fleet action n a r d  men have bcfom tlieir eyes, is always R 
confused assemblage of sbips more or less statiourj-. It is quite 
common to hear it said that “ the best tactics are for every captain to 
put himself alongside an cnciny’s ship,” as if such n thing mere n o w  
possible, unless the enemy’s ship were a consenting partx. Tlic Frcncli 
@em of tactics did much, and Lissn did more, to confnnsc tlic picturc 
of a future sea fight, and to p i n t  it as n meEc of independent attacks. 
The we& a t  Lissa IKIS entirely due to tlic broadside pasition of the 
Italian fleet, and its want of spced; tn-o concomitant blunders whicli 
no commander will ever be mad enough to bring together again. Had 
it bccn otherwise, Tcgetlioff might have had his ~ I I C Z ~ C  to liimsclf, but 
the Italians would hare bccn out of it from their own impetus. If 
tn-o fleets cliargc one anothcr a t  ten knots in tlie end-on position, tlirce 
minutes will elapse bctmcen their being a mile npart and tlicir meeting, 
a d  in anothcr tlirec minutes they will again be n mile apart. If the 
vcry instant after one flcet l i d  passed througll tlie other, they put tlicir 
helms hard over, still the otlicr fleet would bs thi-cc-quartcrs of a milc 
iIWay beforo tlic first’ v-\-ns in pursuit. Undcr such circu1iist:inccs t l c  
0 1 1 1 ~  iircZEc will be amongst the u-ouiided birds, and tlia tj-p of the 
battle wonld bc R rush, a contact, + separation, a re-forniation, ngniii 
facing each otlicr, anotlicr rusIi, and the same tliing repeated. 
The otlicr t jpe  of action-still due to speed nud the cnd-on posi- 
tion, l~-ould be where one fleet mtircs before the other until, by happy 
skill, or bj liappy nccidciit, it is able to  face its pursncr mitli ad- 
vantage. 
HOW to face FOW cncnir with this advantagc, Lop- to bring J-OU~ 
.z rictog. 
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10 TIIE ATTACK AXD DEFENCE OF FLEETS. 
whole fleet on a portion of 1Js wlicn facing Iiim, secnis to mc the 
problem bcforc us. 
We shall all be agreed, I think, tliat anything likc elaboratc manmu- 
\-ring is out of the question, erccpt in the process of retiring. Tlio 
mcrc moment of time irhich elapscs between thc coming into range of 
ti\-o approaching fleets and their shock, renders either manccuming 01’ 
signalling absolutely out of the question. Xay, even nftcr sighting an 
cncmy’s fleet-say ten milcs 0% lie mill be R liardy admiral who at- 
tempts to do morc than tliroioliis fleet into the formation lie intends to 
fight in. 
mistake might be fatal, and tlic chances of mistake are trcbled when 
the nerves arc tightly strung, as they would be at such R moment of 
cscitc.mcnt. 
Tho ~ e r y  numerous, and sometimes cceentric, fighting formations 
which are proposed for adoption by our own and other Navies, may bo 
classified under four heads ; which, on still closer cramination, ma3 for 
the purposcs of argument, be rcsolvcd into two. 
(1). An cstcndcd front, with small depth. 
(2). A narrow front with great depth. 
(3). Tlic mass or square, where depth aud front becarnu cqualiscd. 
(4). The system of gi-oups, homcrcr, disposed. 
In  such circumstances, tlic fewer signaIs the bcttcr, as 
Thcsc are- 
Thc principle being 
that tlic attack or defence is not conccntintcd, each group 
making itsclf felt as occasion offers. 
Tho mass, or square, must possess in n less rlepcc tho advantages 
and disadvantages of tlic cstendcd and narrow front, and of thc small 
and grcat depth. 
Thc groups must bc disposed eitlicr along an cstondcd front or along 
an extended depth, nnd, therefore, must, so long as they remain in 
formation at all, possess the iwakness or tlic strength of thosc forma- 
tions. 
If, hoit-cvcr, we reflect R moment, wc shall see that when an enemy’s 
flcet is approaching in an order of hattlc, alf that can be detected in 
thc few minutes of timc allowed, will be citlier its extended front, or 
its-cstcadcd depth. Tlicreforc, although if timc permitted, I might go 
into grcatcr detail, I think that I shall best arguc out the principles I 
h n w  in view by imagining all formations classcd wider tkc two first 
hcads, and considcring the relations betwxn an cstended front, as 
opposed to an crtcndcd front j R narrow front and grcat depth as op- 
posed to an extended front and small dcpth, and R narrow front and 
cxtcndcd depth as opposed to tlic sanic formation. A few words will 
then sufice to treat of tlic mass or square, andof tho system of 
groups. 
It will also, I think, conducc to cleamcss, if I do not go beyond ilic 
two reprcsentativc formations of the extended front and tlic cstcndcd 
dcptk, namely, the single column in line cibrcast, and the single column 
in line alicad. 
Tho attack I define to be ~yhen tile ships keep tlieh heads towards 
the enemy, aclv.ancing, or tiying to adrnnce on him. Tho defence is 
when tlic fleet retires before tlic cneiny. 
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TIIE ATTACK ASD DEFESCE OF FLEETS. 11 
In the attack there is aln-ap one enormous advpntnge on tho side of 
that fleet which takcs the initiative. Ships cannot morc simultaneously, 
except by signal. One or two ships may turn so closely after each 
other, mored by n common impulse, as to be pmctically simultaneous 
in their action ; but this cannot be carried throughout a fleet. It fol- 
~OWS, tlien, if there is not time to make a signal after the nature of tho 
attack is disclosed, ncithcr will tlicre be time to mnnmurre so as to 
countcmct- it. The Admiral assuming the initiatiTe, or advancing in 
sucli a way as enables him to assume it without n signal, may do so 
ivith some sccurity against 11 counteracting mowment. Whilc he ~ I O  
waits till tlio attack is dercloped in the hope of counteracting it, runs 
the risk of not bcing allowed time to do so. 
Taking, nolr, Diagram VI, we Iinw two flccts 2,000 p d s  apart 
;tpproacLing a t  the rate of 20 miles an hour. The fleet A may 
pass straight on, bearing down upon B, without alteration of coursc. 
In the tlireo minutes clspsing between getting into range and contact., 
one, or a t  most two rounds may be exchanged. Supposing both fkcts 
h:id bccn stationary a t  1,000 yards, and each ship in A fired two gun+ 
at 13, bctirccn one and two shot might strike, with a chance of penetra- 
tion or damage a t  its minimum. But tlie flcet target, so far from 
bcing stationary, is altcring its range eleven yards in x second. Under 
such circumstances, to fire is to waste powder A had bcttcr procced 
witliout firing and with his guns cqnccntrated riglit abeam and liori- 
zontal, rcady to  disclinrgc point-blank into tlie enemy in passing, should 
liis ships maintain their end-on position and so cludc the ram. B, 
under prcscnt circumstances, ought to rcserre his fire, and hencc, d i e n  
the tmo flccts liare passed through one another, they will h a w  fought 
on an absolute cquality, and any less damage done to ono or tlic other 
must be due to stronger plating, bad practice on the other side, or thc 
chapter of accidents. 
But, consider horn very dangerous this method of engaging will bo 
to the fricnds on both sides. I n  the confusion, excitement, imd smoke, 
how more than likely is it that a fricnd will rccciro the broadside in- 
tended for an enemy? True, each fleet runs an equal risk of this, just 
as each. runs an equal risk sf being rammed. But to run thcsc risks 
is not stixtcgy, and it is, I think, plain on thcsc grounds that an attack 
niade dircct, by an extended front, ought not to be mct by a counter 
attack of the same nature. 
It will bc opcn to A, if there is time to make tlic signal bcforo 
getting into rnngc, to put in force tlic application of ramming tactics 
forrncrly mentioncd, nnd bj- altering course togctliei* four points eitlier 
"ray, to endem-our to for& x similar movement on the cnemy, and thus 
to conwrt an artillci-y combat into a t i inl  of skill in ramming. I f  this 
movement trcru xnndc at the moment of coming into range, the new 
positions of the flcets would bo a t  21 and 2. It is pretty clear that A's 
manmuvre 11:is 110 forcing cffcct whatever on B, who, ou the contrarF, 
appears to Iiaw certain ndvnntages placed in his linnds \.vliich he had 
not before. It is true that, for a moment, the artil1ci.y of A may be 
held supcrior to that of D, inasmuch as hc can probably bring morc 
guns to bear. But this ndvantngc passes away :IS A mows to the riglit 
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12 TIIE ATTACIC AXTI) ~EFEPI’CF. OF BLCcrs. 
dong thc front of B, and besides, A receives thc shot of B morc 
directly pcrpcndicular to his brondsidc than docs B thosc of A. 
But  whilc thc port-iring ship of B is guardcd from rams b j  hcr 
right-hand nciglibour, tlic port-wing ship of A is not guarded n t  all, 
and sbonld bc the objcct of 13’s attack by ramming. 
Erccpt thcsc altcrations of coursc together, which must bc ordered 
by signal beforc getting into range, tlierc appears littlc tliat A can do 
SO long as lic remains in lino abrcnst ; and if it bc as appears, tliat 110 
$Tins no atlvantagc citlicr in IL direct ndmncc or a four-point ndmncc, 
i t  seems to me hc must givc up tlio cxtcnded front if he wishes to 
attack an cxtcndcd front with an admntage. 
Lct us tliercforc csamine thc extended and nai~om fronts as opposed 
to each other. Wc supposc tmo 
flccts, A and By ObsciTing oncnnothcr n t  suflicicnt distancc to nllow’of 
consideration and to tlio coming to tlic conclusion to attack : but d 
dctcrmincs to do so in n formation mitli n ~iai-ron- front and B with an 
esteiidcd front. Tlic licadmost ship of A has approached to \vitliiii 
2,000 yards of 13’s ships, Lct us see how mattcrii stnnd bctwccn tlicin. 
A’s leader is open to tlic firc of tlic \vliolc of B’s bon- gnns, n firc 
wliich wc h a w  bcforc slic\vu to bs iiicffectivc. That is hcr idiolc disnd- 
wntxgc. On tlic other Iiand she is witliin thrcc minutes of contact 
with 3’s fleet, and yct has not disclosed tlic ntlturc of her nttiick. 
Supposing tlic Admiixl of A to bc lcacling, liis ordcrs ~ ~ o u l d  bc to tlic 
ships nsteru of him to follow his motions logelher, ns nearly ns pos- 
siblc, to conccntratc thcir guns nt  point blank, riglit nlicad, and to 
pour in thcir shot on tlic instant of passing an cncmy’s ship. 
A has tlircc attacks opcii to hini : the ccntrc or eitlicr flank of liis 
cncmy, nnd lcaving liim in doubt up to within three minutes of corn- 
inencing his attack, it i s  mnnifcstly iinpossiblc for 33 to conntcract liim 
cwn if thcrc wcrc n mowmcnt capnblc of doing it. Supposc A cliooscs 
to picrcc tho centre, and tlicrcforc simply continiics his coiirsc ; as hc 
p:sscs betwccn two enemy’s sliips lic cci-tainlj- rcccives tlicir two broad- 
sides ; but if hc bc equal in poivcr on both sidcs lic gives tlicm ns good 
ns hc gcts, with this advnntngc, that liis shot which miss onc cnciny’s 
ship may hit nnotlicr ; wliilc tlic enemy’s shot vihicli miss him may 
dnmagc tlicir fricnds. But if A’s lcadcr has alrcndy becn subjcctcd to 
bou- firc from tliosc sliips bctwcen \rliicli lic pnsscs, tlicy mill linrdly 
l o  rcady in the tinic to giw him bro:idsidc firc ns wcll from tlicsc guns. 
But in any cnsc, thc momcnt A’s lcadcr lins exchanged broadsides with 
licr cncmics, and long bcforc they arc in n condition to fire agtnin, n sue- 
cession of fresh sliips pass into lici* placo at tli? iiitc of oiic cwry twcnty 
secoiids or thcrcabonts. Tlic t x o  sliips bctwccii whicli A.is cffccting 
liis pnssngc will thus rcccii-c five brontlsidcs npiccc in tibout it miiiutc 
;ind n half, witliont inorc tlinii n singlc reply, a i d  if this is not enough 
for them, I tliink it ought to be. 
Herc wc haw tlic process of “ doubliiig on tlic c n ~ u i ~ - , ~ ~  as 1 con- 
ccivc it iuust in fiituro be prn‘ctised. Tlic pi-inciplc remains tlic snmc 
ns O Y C I ,  only tlic detail lins nltcrcdwitli tlic timcs. 1nstcr.d of doubling 
simultaneously and so placing R sl ip  betwist t r o  fires, wc must now 
This w c  hare inDiagramTTII, 5s. 1. 
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THE ATTa\CII A S D  DEFESCE 01’ FLEETS. 13 
noub1c in succcssiou, serving him with a coiitinucd succcssion of frcsh 
ships. 
‘1‘11~ onls objcction I can scc to this ccntrc attack is, that you lay 
pirsclf  opcn to tho firc of both flanks on your near approach, whereas, 
sttacking on tlic flank, yon can receive no morc tlian half that 
amount. 
In this attack, if tho Admiral cliooscs to thrcatcn thc ccntrc till 
c l ~ s c  up with tho eneniy, yhicli I think mill bo hardly ncccssary7 his 
s11ips sliould turn togcthcr tornrds tho intcndcd flank and thcn turn 
sp in  into linc alieacl, ns shown in the diagram, pouring in succcssivc 
1jroadsides into tho cnemy’s wing-ship in passing. ’A’s tear ship 
sll~uld, I think, bo clircctcd to attack tho wing ships of the cncniy 
\rith his ram, and for this purposc should steer further out than tlic 
ships ahead, so ns to girc himself room to turn. His orders should bc 
not to embroil liimsclf by making n sccond attempt if hc misscs tlic 
first,-indccd, lie can hardly obtain n second opportunitj-,-but to 
follow tlic rest of thc fleet, wl&h should rc-form with their hcads ngaiii 
tou-nrds tlic cnemx, rcady to act again as niny bc ncccssar~. 
‘l’licrc arc in this kind of combat n i-aricty of circnmstances to bo 
noted trhicli scem to me to tell in Kmour of A’s attack. If tlierc is no 
,rind, A’s ships after tlic Icadcr, will obscrvc 13’s wing ships cmerging 
from tlic smokc of tlicir own niicl A’s guns, bcforc they themsclrcs 
]m-c cntcrcd it. They will conseqncntly bc morc mastcrs o f  thc sitiinT 
tion tlinn I3’s ships cau possibly be. If B’s wliolc line continucs to fire 
from his born guns, as no doubt lic ~vould, thcrc is tlic greatest danger 
of his’linc getting into confusion, and also of some of tho shot intcnrled 
for an cncmy reaching no furtlicr than n fricnd. It is, I bclicve, a fact 
that with modern heavy guns thc compasscs arc tlirown completely ont 
of scar, so that no formation can bc maintaincd by compass d i l c  
firing. 
In  d’u arlwxfcc tlic compass is not appcalcd to a t  all, as cncli ship 
simply follows her ncxt nlieacl in thc closcst possible order j and nl- 
tliougli tho formation will probably bc broken ultimately7 this will not 
linppcn till its work has bccii donc; and it is clear of smoke in rcar of 
tlic cncmy. 
If tlic 6 d  w r e  bloring towards tho attacked flank across tlic 
cncmy’s front, his view will bo intcrrnptcd, and his firc mill slack. 
But tlic smoke may also shroud A’s ships from onc another cven beforc 
tliey firc, and their broadsides mty be thrown aray. 
If tlic mind is from the nttacked flank A r i l l  always bo in tho clear, 
wliilc thc ships of B’s line mill bc shroudccl, each onc by tlio smokc of 
his nciglibour. 
I think, thcrcfore, that A slioiild choose thc wcatlicr flank for liis 
attack. If the wind be with B’s flcct, SO niucli thc worst for hiiii, 
while it will not affect A. Wliilc; if tlic mind be with 11’s flcct, tlic 
conditions mill bc thcsc of n calm, cscept that A will bc longcr iii liis 
own smolcc aftcr hc has passcd tho cncmy. 
But wdiilc showing the ndvantagcs of thus opposing n narmn- to a11 
cstcnilecl front, wc must not omit to asccrtain what possibilitics of 
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14 
defencc lic in tlic cstcndcd front. A t  first sight, many movcm6nts will 
suggest tlicmselws as practicable, bu t  whcn wc apply the rigid stan- 
dards of timc and space, I\-e sliall think din’ercntlJ-. 
Rcmcmbcr, thcrc arc but threc minutcs in which 13 must form nncl 
csecutc his plan. On tho fncc of it, thcrcforc, tlicrc can bc no corn- 
biucd manccunc not prcviously arranged. Xo prcrions arrangement 
coulcl embracc morc than n single movcment, yet thcrc is no singlc 
morcment preserving tlic line abreast, which can be csecuted in tho 
timc and spncc csccpt by snrrcndcring the attacking position. 
Supposc I3 were to liopc to swing liis linc round on his port wing- 
ship as tlic pirot? To do this, tlic port wing-slips, tlic wry object of 
liis solicitude, must reduce their spced, enabling A’s rcar-ship, already 
warned, to ram them witli ease. But in no case can WS starboard 
wing-ship comc upon A’s rear-ship in time. &pin, B surrcnders his 
bow-firc in attcmpting any mana3uvrc, for it is :idmittcd by all impos- 
siblc to manccuwe in smokc. Besides, m y  onc who has espericncc of 
flcct manccuvring, is ai.varc of thc difficnlty of prcscrving thc formation 
when swinging round, even for drill purposes. 
Singlc sliips, it has bccn said, may piercc A’s line or ram him. This 
is so, but only by passing nstcrn of their friends, and so separating 
from them and plunging into tho midst of their cncmies, can tllcyeffcct 
their purposc. But then thoy pass at oncc into tho hcaricst of thc 
smoke, and i-un n t  least as grcat a risk of destruction tlicmsel\rcs as 
thcy bking upon their enemies. 
On tlic wlioIc, thcrcforc, my ricm is, tliat an cstcnded front is an 
cscccdin$y weak formation for attack, nnd ought to succumb to thc 
narrow front in all cascs ~rlicrc things arc otherwise equal. 
But thc extended front may, when timc permits, bc cliangcd for thc 
narrow one. If 13, surrcndcring his idca of tlic linc abreast, were, on 
perceiving A’s approach in linc nhcad, to meet him in tho samc 
formation, he ~ ~ o u l d  a vanco his port wing-ship and form astern of 
liim. 
This mould g k c  us tho narrow front as opposed to tho narrow front, 
sliova in Diagram VII, fig. 2, and I think wc sec tho balnncc is 
restored, and that if both flccts SO advance, they will fight on an 
equality. 
It is of courso useless, and perhaps foolish, for thc lcadcrs to Open 
firc till abreast of cachothcr ; the1 will then cschangc their broadsides, 
and if they both pass on, will each reccivc tho broadsidc of fresh ships 
beforc thcy can reply cffecttdy. Herc tho samc qualities might 
stand tlic British seaman gunner in as good stead as formerl~, pro- 
vided, that is, that machinery morc pcrfect for v o k i n g  guns is not 
adopted by other nations, and a rapidity of firc obtained, which T ~ Q  
cannot compctc witli. 
But without this, or in spite of this, A may by proper orders to &j 
ships, gain an advantagc orel* B. 
Supposc, for instance, tliat A’s leader, and each ship astern of him, 
wcrc ordcfcd thc moment they had fired tlicir broadsides, to turn 
sharp off to starboard, B’s fresh ships would never get the opportunity 
of’fiihg a t  all, and. his leader and her nest astern, mould h r o  
TIIE 4F.l’ACIC A%D DEFENCE OF FLEETS. 
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THE ATTACK AND DEFESCE OF FLEETS. 16 
pceircd tlic firc of tlic whole of A'S ships. When thc smokc clcared 
n,,+il~, \s-ould find hinisclf in quarter linc with l3 in his rear, and 
Diglit dctcrminc on the nest stage of his attack. 
I haw now discusscd as closcly ns timc permits, tho principlcs of 
~ a r a l  Strategy iii thc attack as ihcy ham presented tlicmselves to me 
such limited ciamination as I ham bccn ablc to girc to thcm. 
It will be sccn that I bclierc tho cxtended front to bc n weak forma- 
tion, and tlint in no case shoiild it be taken up in an attack. It Iins, 
nppearcd also in tlic coui'se OF my cnquiry that tlic bow-firc, on ex- 
irenic training of giins, is not of great vnlne, mid that more is to bc 
cloIm by broadsidc fire in attacking fleets. Tliesc conditions appear 
rc-icrscd whcn onc flcct rctircs bcforc anothcr. Then, unless the 
pursncr can enforce by his ~peed ,  or the pursued takes up for himsclf, 
tho position of attack, the result must dcpcnd on the goodncss of tho 
gunnery practice. The pursued must spread out an extended rear, 
rind tlic pursuer nn cstcnded front, in order to got the full raluc of 
their artillcry. Hero tlic distnnccs will bo f&Iy pcrmancnt, and the 
boiy and stern firc becomes cffcctive. I cannot conccivc, lion-erer, a 
clecisiro victoiy gained on such principlcs; and for the defence, I 
would rather convert i t  into an audacious attack iipon cither flank of 
tllc pclrsucr in tho manner bcforc describcd. 
I havc nlrcady stated that if n formation, such as thc hollow squarc 
proposcd in Russia, ~OSSCSSCS dcpth and extended front in combination, 
it possesses also the weaknesses nud strcngths of each quality, anrt 
t~~crcfore, if the bctter qualitics of tho linc ahead b~ opposed to tIic 
less good ones of tho sliortcr sido of a squarc, thcro mill still bo an 
advantage, though not so great on thc part of the formcr. 
Thcso compromises sccm to mc to bc proper for adoption by sucll 
nations as, from their mant of naval prcstigc, may be more solicitous to 
guard against dcfeat than to cnsmo victory. I .must own my sym- 
pnthies lie in'thc direction of audacity, and b determination to win all 
or to Iosc all ; and hcncc I do not SO much concern m p l f  with half 
measures. 
It mill bo sccn that I lay great stress on compactness and conccn. 
tration in attack, and I am ill consequence opposed to systems of 
rescr~es of separate flects ncting'conjointly, 01' lastly tt, the attack 01- 
defence by groups. 
I cannot a t  prcscnt sec how, when fleets n ~ c  a t  speed, n group can 
act indcpendcntly without running tho grcat risk of finding itself 
surrounded by enemies nnd bcyond tho support of its friends. Suppose 
n group such as Figs. 3 and 4, dingram VII, opposed to even tho samo 
numbcr of ships only, in closc oidcr in linc ahead: Tho broadside fir0 
of one ship in cacli forniation is maskcd, and in Fig. 8. the attacking 
forcc of thrco ships mould reccivc on0 broadside from tho leader a t  
double distancc, and onc from tho wing-ship n t  closo distancc. But 
this ming-ship mould g?t in rcturn three brondsidcs a t  closc distance. 
s o  mitli four skips in h.ne ahcad attacking the group of four. TI10 
leader might sustain ono broadsidc a t  closc distance, and two a t  
h b l c  distance. But the wing-ship w o ~ l d  sustain four broadsides a t  
closc quarters. Then obscrvc tlic wcaLness of thcsc groups in tho 
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1G TIIE ATTACK ASD DEFKX‘CIS OF FLICETS. 
matter of iamrniiig. Fig. 3 Iias two ships out of three, :mil Fig. 4 
three ships out of four, unguardccl. Such an opportunitJ for thc rnm- 
ships of n line nliead is d l  that can be desired, cspccinlly in Fig. 4, for 
tho ram which misses thc winpsliip, will almost to n ccrtninty catch 
tho rear. 
Such, then, is niy slight snnmayy of the liiio I conccivo our stud7 
of X a d  Strategy should tnkc. I should bc F C I ~  s o r r ~ ,  indeed, to 
dogmatise on n subjcct Khich is to all intents nnd purposes n now 
science, but I hope to h a ~ c  shoKn that thcrc arc sound principles to 
bc got a t  oven in pencc time, if TVO mill only takc suficient troublo to 
find thcm. 
Comiuandcr DAWSOS, R.S. : I I l o p  that nothing nxiy occur to tlik Institution 
to  prcrcnt for thc futurc our haring thc plcasurc of rccciring infonnation from tllc 
lcctiirc~ that arc occasiondj- givcn licrc upon thc principlcs of I‘ iiaral tnctics ;I’ for I 
do not know nhcrc elso shodd be nblc to  g i n  any infonnation upon that subjcct. 
It is trUQ n-c harc n Xnral College n t  Portsmouth ; but I am not mvnrc that thcrc is 
any Profcssor of “naval tactics” thcrc. I uudcwtaud t h t  a t  tlic Military Collcgc 
thcrc is a Professor of “military tactics.” Wc Iiarc Iicard of n “Profcssor of mili- 
tary history” a t  that collegc ; but I nm not nn-arc t h t  thcrc is nny ‘ I  Profcssor of na rd  
history” n t  tlic Karal Collcgc. Them is alsoa ‘I Professor ofartillcry” at thc3Iilitnry 
Collcgc; but not o m  n t  tlic Xnral Collcgc; ercii n a r d  architccturc is not tauglit 
tlicrc, EO t h t  nc arc really depcndcnt upon this Institution for any information 
that n-c may obtain ns to thc principlca of n a d  tnctica, na rd  gumcry, and collatcml 
subjccts. ‘I‘uniingfrom thb  sabjcct, I remarkin this p p c r  tlmt tlicrc is not n singlc 
fact brought fonvnnl showing that thc British Flcct, which eosts so much, has donc 
nn7thing to clucidatc any of the questions nliich nrisc in dctcrmining tlic bcst nay of 
using tlic mrious norcl shi D and wapom n-ith n-liich it i3 furnishd for purposcs of 
war. Idouotmcan to E3y t t i t  the Fleet has qadc no crperimcnts, pmctiscd no Tar- 
liko ~ l ~ a n a c u ~ ~ s ,  or gathcrcd 110 ucl‘ul cxpcricnce, but I incrcly draw attention to this 
circumstnncc, that if .any portion of tho Fleet has clabomtcd erpcrimcntally niiy 
facts bcaring upon futurc \ran, thcy harc ngt bccn brought fornard non-; and, as 
far 09 my information gocs, thcsc crpcrimcntal or other crpcricnccs harc not bccn 
commuuicatctl from that ~~cccssarily small portion of tlic Flcct \rliich may Iinrc 
pined  thc knodcdgc, to the Ollicers of that otlier krgcr scctioii of-tho Flcct wliicli 
has bad no opportunity of acquiring it for thcmsclrcs. Xor do I bclicrc that thcrc 
i3 m y  iuca113 in cxistciicc by which such cspcricncc can bc communicntcd from thosc 
d i o  gin it, to  tliosc Oficcre afloat who Iiarc not that opportunity. Thi3 n-nstc of 
orperimentnl crpcricncc and profcssional knowlcdgc ia n rcry important point, to 
~ l l i c h  I wish to dircct attention. €’=sing from tho nbsciicc of facts, it appears to 
nic that tho futurc tactics of tho N a q  dcpcnd iipon tlic rclatirc ralucs of thc 
wcapons m t h  xrhicli wc nrc going to fight. I concur with a goor1 dcal, in fact, I 
almost cntircly concur d t h  what Captain Colomb said a3 to  the dangers that may bc 
anticipated from, nnd thc skill ahicli i3 rcquircd in, tlic vcc of tlic prescnt Harrcy 
torpcdo in a gcncml cnggcmcnt. That h onc of tho tliinga which i t  appears to mc 
ought, in tiruo of pcacc, to hart bccn long ago found out b thc Flcct and rcmcdicd. 
a l e  Ilarrcy t o y d o  lias bccii q~okcn of bcforc tlic world i r  twcuty or thirty ycars, 
and mas ndoptcc ns R fi-hting ncapon for thc British Flcrt about two or tlirco years 
ago ; EO that Captnin Cbdlomb ought to  bc ablc to say that tho Chauncl squadron, 
and tho 3Icditerrancan. tho detachcd, and other squadrons, as well as singlc ships, 
h s c  during thosc thrcc ycara hndlcd  tlicsc Harrcy toqmlocs in crc? o--iblc nay ; 
tint tliey hayo foiiud out that sucli is 
not tlic casc. Again, i t  is t m n t y  ycaw ago sincc Sir George Sartoriw and Sir Bnr- 
tholomcw Sidiran adrocatcd tlio eruploymcnt of tho ram, nnd for tlic last ten yrars 
erery ship built for thc X n v  ha3 h d  hcr bon’J fortificd nnd armed for rainping ; 
yet wc nrc thcorising on tho subjcct to this hour, d t h o u t  a singlc nsecrtaincd fact 
being produced ablc to sliorr that any British ship or squadron has donc n ringlc 
thing to elncidntc that subject., or that a singlc Britisli Officer has gained an atom of 
ancl SUCh is t ~ i c  asc, and tliat sucfi 
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TIIE ATTACK A S D  DEFKSCE OF FLEETS. 17 
c,pcricncc in this W ~ ~ ~ O I I  with wliicli so Iimnr of our ships arc proridcd. Wc arc 
ol,lip(l to go toRussia to find out w1ut thc RUII C:UI do, and to borrow thc practical 
l~sl~c’icncc of thc Russiaii Xary ; tlic cnptaius of which arc rcgdarly traiiicd to its 
Ildc. I aui onc of tliorc WIIO think that tlic IIarrcy torpcdo is right in principlc, and 
tllat a little moncy for erpcrimcnt~, n littlc crpcricncc, aud a littlc talent applicd to  
it, ,vould makc it n rcry d c  and n rcry dcstructirc wcapon. Dut, crcn taking it as 
it is, it  is a wry forniidablc n-cnpon. Look at that diagimn Xo. G, eliowing two 
ilccts in liiic nb rmt  meeting cnd-on. Onlv thrcc ~ninutcs will elapse aftcr comiug 
,rithiu nngc of fiw, before thcr mcct. If‘ a t  tlic beginning of thosc tlircc ~uiiiiitcs 
tilc ships of onc flcct, or of both, n-crc to cztcnd a IIarrcy torpcdo on both quarters, 
:rl,d vcrc to still continuc tlicir coursc3, tho consequciiccs aould bc somctliing fcarful. 
If the linrrcy torpcdo in its prcecnt condition is not powerful cnoug> to  brcnk 
tllrough an arinourcd ship a t  thc mtcr-linc, I do not ECC any diflicultr In ciilarging 
its q n c i t y  aud introducing n clctonatiug cxplosivc wliicli mill readily do EO. If wc 
(10 uot employ tho torpcdo, tlic Ruesims 1ril1,aud I slioidd ndriac tlicin to put n littlc 
l l l~ rc  clj-iiainitc or gicn-cotton iuto it, and ~ m k c  it powcrful cnougli to pcrfomtc 
annour phtc3 a t  tlic satcr-liuc. Tlic Ikrrcr torpcdo might bo doublctl o r  
trcblccl in capacity n-ithout any grcat incrcasc in din~cnsions and without losing its 
Ilandiucss. A s  to. its Eafcty a3 regards fricndly ships whcn ernploycil in o gcucrd 
action, I BCC 110 dilticulty in t l ~ c  application of clcctricitj- to tlic l I n r v q  torpcdo as 
tllc igniting agent, and tlicn it would be obsolutclyin~iocuo~i~ upon occiclcutal contact 
Ivitli fricnrlly rcsscls, as it could only crplodc at tlic will of tlic opcmtor, who would 
,lot niakc tlic comicction with the clcctric ba t t cq  till I10 saw tlic torpcdo approaching 
.$ lioatile ship, and the nirc could bc discoiiiicctcd on a fd i i rc  to makc contact. A s  
to tho rid to tho torpcdo-opcntors from artillcq or Gatling-gun firc during thc tlircc 
Ininutcs that tlic two flccts nrc approaching undcr firc, I do not tliink it sould bc 
rcrj-inucli if tlic TCSSC~ opcmting iras nu ordinary ironclad, anncd as usual with guns. 
TIIC diUicuIty i3 onc that tlic Flcct 6ught to  Iiarc crpcrimcntcd upon and dctcmlincd 
long ngo. In tlic nbscncc of practical cxpcricncc 011 tho part of our Sary, n i j  opinion 
i3 that tlicrc woiild bc no clifliculty, proriding tlicrc n-as suitablc corer for tlic opc- 
>:don ; and if that was donc, thc dnngcr from artillcq or Gatling-gun fire would bo 
orcrcoinc. At any rnte ditlicultice arc mado to bc orcmome, and it. ought to bc tlic 
busiuces of the Fnry, as n traininn EChOOl for n-ar, to  attack and conqucr thcui, and 
what better tnining for war tlinn t h  our sca-going Officcrs slrodd cxpcrimcutaliso 
upon thcir x\-capons, rCcord thosc cspcriincnts, and comuiunicatc their failure or snc- 
ccss to tkc rcst of thc Nary? Bclicrin; a3 I do that a good dcnl may bc rlcrclopccl 
out of improrcd naml torpcdocs, nnd that torpcdocs in onc fonn or nuothcr will bc 
uscd against us in thc opcn sca,wlictlicr wc cm lortllcm or not, I think thc torpcdo 
will gorcm thc tactics of tho Flcct ; though, b c n  both sidcs arc ~rmcd 6 t h  it, it 
\dl ouly Berm as D dcfcncc ngainst mins nnd against llostilc torpcdocs, and w i l l  thus 
bccouic n dcfcusirc ratlicr than nn offcusirc wrapon. It \rill bc uttcrlj impoesiblc 
for oiic slii > to a33 uithin 200 yards of aiiotlicr TC~SCI toxin:: Harrcy’s torpcdocs ; 
and, if botL s i L  nrc equally arulcc~, fleets ] n u t  liccp a t  that respectful cfistaucc. 
IIcncc it follow that flccts wiU not nttcnipt munning, bccausc tlicy wnuot npproacli 
nitliin ‘00 prds without miitual dcstructiou. Tlic nction m i l l  tlicu resolre itsclf 
ciitircly into nn artihrJ contest. Xorv, WC harc nlndc trclnclldolu stridcs in nrtil- 
lcry of latc. It is oidy sir  j-cars ago that wc w r c  told by thc lighcet ~ c a i ~ i i - l i k ~  
:iutlioritics, that it n-as uttcrly impossiblc to work guns of morc than sir tons wciElit 
on tlic broadsidc. Wc aro now nblc to work 25-ton guns upon tlic broadsidc. ‘flio 
12-ton guns can bc fired oncc ercry minute, wldst tlic 25-ton gun can fin, ouc shot 
crcry two miuutcs. Fothiug could be morc cflicicut or iuorc sccuro than thc mcans 
by d ~ i c l i  thcsc pondcrous guns arc manipnlatcd, EO far a3 training, running in nnd 
out, nnd clcratiug is conccmcd. Thc mounting of guns has n large influcncc upon 
tlicir accuracy ; n smooth, rcgular, yct n p i d  morcmcnt assisting thc aim wry cou- 
siilerably , But the loading nmugcincnts arc cxrccdingly EIOW, clumsj, and unsafe, 
and mig it be niiicli iuiprorccl, whicli would iucrcasc thc rapidity of firc. Wc wcro 
to!d by Captain Colonib in his fornicr Iccturc, and I quite concur in thc obserrntiou, 
that tlic accuracy of thc firc of our few 1icm-y riflcd guue is r c q  s u d ;  that not 
itborc om shot in c r c ~  tcn was crpcctctl to hit tlic mnrk. Ken; accuracy of firc is 
ii qucjtioii w11ic11 it is lhc proriucc of iioral gmmcrs to bc ablo to dcnl nitli. I am 
W L .  SVI .  c: 
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18 TIIE ATTACK Ah’D DEl‘ESCE OF FLEETS. 
mrc if good eca-shooting vas a iuilitnry question, wc slioiIId Inrc  had thrcc or four 
coininittees nppointcd, who ~rould 11nvc crpcrimcntaliecd for jcar3 upon it, and n-c 
slionld h r c  liad n ,great many bluc books and cract rccords of s c w d  thousand 
roiinda to rcfcr to ; but as i t  is a naral mnttcr, n-c IUTC ,no information 
upon tlic subjcct csccpt tlic onc crpcrimcnt in tlic Chnnnel squadron, which 
Ciiptain Colomb 11a3 quotcd. XOW, good shooting a t  scs drpcuds, nniongst 
othcr things, upou knowiug tlic range, Admiral Iiydcr clabont ccl t n b h  and 
iucthods for nsccrtaining disiauccs, trrcutj p a r 3  ago ; and to thi3 day thcrc nrc 
no- nieaiis takcn to girc cffcct t o  tliosc tables and to c a v  thcm out by stationing 
pcoplc for tlic purpose of obscrrin? tlic distances, crccptwlicn firiug a t  n target from 
tlic largcr ships. It ought to  bc donc to all w ~ s c l s  on crcry occasion of going to 
quarters. Thcro is anothcr serious diniculty in thc var of obtaining nccnncy of firc 
inidcr lively rolling motion a t  sc3,and tlmt is that the ncwrifld y n s  arcrcrybndly 
sighted. Thc old GS-pounrlcr i n n  lircly scri can now iliakc bcttcr prncticc tlian onc 
of our 9-inch rillcdfguiis. This arises from tho n m  guns bcing EO badly sightcd, 
lhc Emallcit risual crror in taking aim Iiaring n much grcatcr cffcct upon tlic nngc  
tlmi a likc risunl error in thc old gnus, o d n g  to tlic dccrcnscd distancc bctwccn tlic 
rcnr and forc sight in ritlcd guus. On ordinary occasions tlic linc of -iision of tlic cnptahi 
of :I yu standing six or ciglit fcct from tho rcar siglit, must pas; aborc thc timgcnt 
sight. n l c  ccrtical Iicight which tho liuc of +ion pas:cs aborc thc rrnr ~ i g h t  consti- 
lutes D risusl crror, ~rliicIi is thc ciiusc of nll  hrgc crrors in tlic rnugc, ~ h c n  firing 
:it h o m i  distances. This &ual crror niny bc taken at  two-tciiths of nu inch a t  
ordinary times, but, wlicn in lircly motion, tlic shot full3 300 or 400 yartk bcyond tho 
targcf, tlic rcrticd rknal crror is crickntly cousidcrnblc: Thc cdnc in nngc  doc to 
it @rcn hciglit of Ihic of risioii aborc thc rcar sight dcpcnds upon thc clistanco 
bctwccn tllc t no  sights. A x-isunl crror of half an iiicli orcr tlic tangent sight-uot n 
very largo ouc to ~nnkc n-itli lircly motion-will, in tlic GS-pounder, amount to about 
150 yard3 n t  1,000 yards’ rnngc ; but in tlic 0-incli rifled guu i t  amounts to morc 
tlmn clonblc that clistnncc. Aiid if tlic &part sight bc ~ C ~ I O T C C I ,  the cliffcrcncc 
bcl\rcci~ tlic two \\-odd bc sucli that tlic GS-poundcr would, a t  1,000 jards’ distaucc, 
~nnkc about onc-fourtli thc amount of diEcrcncc in the mngc for that half-inch cisual 
crror. This INS nn important influcnco on good sliooting from lircly ships. Tho 
power of the guns may bc rcry much cnhanccd by n bettcr systcni of riIXng. Tlic 
prcocnt systeni of rilling altogctlicr fail3 to girc rotation to  loug sIicll3 such as tho 
gun3 arc dcsigncd to projcct. Iustcad of cmplopng n Ii110n-n sp tcm nhich \rill 
girc tlic necessary rotiition, lrc rcducc thc wigli t  and capacity of tlic projcctilc, 
11icidq sacrificing ouc-fifth tl:c wight  and two-NtIis tlic bursting powr of tho 
11-inch guns, and onc-half thc shell pomr  of thc ncir 3S-tou gun. As guns arc 
rcdaccd in numbcr, i t  bccomcs morc csscntial to Etndy tho effectirc ucc ofindiridunl 
gims, and ~ r c  an Ecnrcclp afford to sncrificc so mucli of thcir nard cfficicncy to il 
Lad srstcm of rifling. I f  I am.corrcct that futurc uarnl tactics must bc directed to 
the most cffcctirc cmplojnicut of artillery firc, thcn tlic iniprorcnicnt of artillcry firc 
i 3  brought into grcntcr proxuincncc tlinn crcr, whilst in onr inorc rcccnt construc- 
tions, tlic number of guns cnrricd 113s clccrcascd so wry much. 3Lany of our older 
irouclads \taut rc-nnning, tlicir nruiamcnts beiug iucapablc of penetrating thc ucwcr 
rcsscl_*. Tkcrc L no csscntial connection bctirccn ivcnli nriiiour and weak ~ I I I I ~ ,  
:iud no rca:on why an “Agiucoart ” should not pcrforatc n “ IIcrculcs.” In tho 
confuscd vi&e of :L gcncr.ll action, it is impossiblc’tliat liostilc slips sliodd seek 
out tlic onc carrjing corresponding thickncss of amour, crcn if tlic thicliucss was 
legibly imrkcd on cacli broadside. .\Vithout dwelling any longcr on thc subjcct of 
pnns, i t  still oppcar~ to  mc that “tactic3” clcpcnd apon thc ivcapon you makc 
IFC of- Captain Colomb l1n3 throw1 orcr D most iuqiortaut \\.capon-tlic gtu, 
i:nd h 3  basd thc principlclcs of tactics upon its non-cmplojincnt in gcncrd nctious. 
I f  that ~rcapon is a rcality, then all his principles of tactics arc U T O I I ~ ;  if that 
\rcapon i not n rcnlity, then thc principlcs of tactics cniinciated are right! I am 
poriy that in sucli vitnl qncstioiw, spccultirc opinions can nlouc bc ndrauccd in clis- 
cussion 011 on0 sidc or tho otlicr, instcad of our bcing ablc to~dcnl  with asccrtaincd 
facts. It woddbc farmorc mtisfnctorJ- to bc ablc to eay that so many shipshdimdcr 
SO many differcnt conditions, rnndc such nnd such crpci%ncuti with sncli and such 
rcsdts. But in thc gcncrnl ignorance idiic!i obtain.; niloat as lo thc calnbilitics of 
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THE ATTACK AXD DEFESCE OF FLEETS. 
modern Ellip3 and ucapons, I cannot point to thc cspcriciicc gaincd, but mujt  deal 
only with rpcculntirc rcasoning. I wmt  to  clear away thc groiiiid as to thc scapons 
to  bc cinplojcd, in tlic Iiopc that tliosc who follow mc, and n.ho may haw had iiioro 
crpcriencc than I hnrc in antiquitcd p a r d c  fleet morcniciit~, may tell IF, in the casc 
of a flcct. so circuinstanccd that artillcry fire i3 to bc thc dcciding ucapon, nud that 
mniming is rcndcrcil impossible bccausc of tlic UIC of 3 safc and powcrfid torpcdo, 
what nrc thc tactics wliicli slionld tlicn bc rniploycd. 
Adnlird of thc %lcct, Sir GEORGE SARTORICS : I d s h  to  mnkc oiic or t n o  pcr- 
soual obscrntions wit11 rcgnrd to nh t  Captain Coloiiib liiis said as to thc priority of 
aclrocating tlic muiuing principlc. I t  is nu old principlc. I iicrcr drcamcd of 
taking to iiiyeclf tlic claim of originalitj in tlic matter. I t  is onc of thc first tliiugs 
wc Icurii at  ECIIOOI in reading of thc na rd  battlcs of old, tlic nncicnt modc of fighting 
wit11 thc mii prow. I was commanding II E I U ~  whcn atcani tvns introduccd, nnd 0110 
of thc first thing3 that struck us, thc young nicn of thoec days, was tlic possibilitj of 
introducitig tlic minniiug principlc through thc aid of stcam. But tlicrc, onc soon 
E:LW t l x  formation of tlic sliip, aiid the mil-powr uufi~ronnblc for tlic purposc, 
niid that tlic bow-rprit, tlic ciitc-atcr-tlic two h t t c r  wcrc EO many buffci-s to  dcadcii 
tlic action of tlic vcs-rel-\~liiLzt tlic minming ship would bc coniplctcly cxposcd t o  
tlic ralimg broadside ofthcshipattackcd. For tlic time 1 p c  up thc idca. It was 
iluriiig tlrc Criuicau wnr, wvkcii tlic Frcncli Iloating b;itlcrr arrircd out--:i rcsscl 
worked cqixillj- inidcr e n i l  or undcr stc:im, mid ;it tho wnie timc inrulncmblc ;- 
that it struck iiic that tlic moiiicnt hail now rcnll;). arrived, whcn tlic priiiciplc of tho 
uncicut ixm could bc rcint'rocluccd. dud it  m 3  in 185.1-5 that I wotc  to tho 
Aclmiraltj my view upon tlic subjcct, mid prcrscc'l for a Commission to csnininc 
into it.* With rcgnrd to tho 
tlicory tlint Cnptniii Coloiiib ILM h.id domi, tlicrc is a grcat dcnl of csccllcnt good 
ECllsc in it. It i3 wry ncccsaary that somc good thcory slioidl bc now fonncd upon 
tlic inanagcmcnt of flccts nndships and futurc war tactics, bascd upon tlic bcst matc- 
rinls IFC actually possess in orclcr to  prcparc and bc in rcndincss for coiitiugc~icica 
bcforc t h c j  arrirc. Thc attention of Xaral Ofliccrs cnnnot bc too constautlj kept on 
the nlcrt on this most important subjcct. d a c l l  bascd thcory oncc fonncd, the sub- 
acqncnt perfecting of it bccomcs ta far casicr task. I a,wc also nitli Captain Colomb 
that thc torpcdo is, appnrciitly, ta formidablc wapon, but d ic i i  it comcs to be brou$t 
iuto piwticc in actual rarfarc, thcrc arc so many circunistanccs rcquircd to uiiitc, 
to  malie it act wit11 certainty, that  >-ou couid not dcpcnd npon it, pnrticularly 
by tlic brondsiclc attack. I n  my opinion no rcsscl can bc bcttcr fitted for using tlic 
toqxdo tlimi tlic rim, propcrlj constructcd. According to my idca, thc rain ought 
to bc cscccding1,lj- rapid, cxcccdingly Iinndy ; tlicrcforc, no otlicr vcascl could bc bcttcr 
fitted for using tlic torpcdo. In D gcncml ~mrnl  action it is h ~ l l y  possible that tlic 
torpcdo cau bc dcpcndcd u1'01i or u s c d  uitli a n j  ccrtainty or Eafcty. You canuot 
19 
I di:ill, lionmcr, say nothing morc upoii.that point. 
* Sir Gcorgc Sartorius lias rcqucstcd that tlic nccoiiipaii;yhg notc m y  be addcd to 
Extrac t~  froliz .Letfei*s adtbwscd io Sia.. C h u r l ~ ~  Wood, ~ W J  Lord Ilal$ax, G 
'I LcL I U C  c s m c s t l ~  d i ~ w  Four nttcution to  n liict wvliicl~ I h n ~ c  no doubt 1 1 ~  1 1 1 ~  
ECntcd itcclf to  man^ otlicr minds bcforc, viz., tlic usc of stcnnicn as battering 
I' r o m  for sinking sIiips. n c  rucccssful crpcriuicuts of iron plated ships has 1 1 0 ~  
" rcmorcd all objcutioiis to, and rciidcra pcrfcctl>- sufc, siniplc, and C ~ C U C ~ O U S ,  t11k 
" modc of \varfiirc,)' &., &c. 1' Lct IUC suppsc a stciiiii vcsscl built without n port 
" or n shiglc gun with grcnt longitudinal strCUgth, that bciiig tlic dircctioii ixi wlich 
" tllc blow n-onlcl bc giycli, with bow built in with mcsivc tinibcr, and tlic T C ~ S C ~  
' I  covcrcd with iron pktcj of sufiiciciit tliickncss to rcsist that. Thcn with an 
" cuginc of 1,000 1i.q). a t  ta spccd of 15 or 16 knots, could tlicrc bc 3 momcnt's doubt 
" a3 to the fatc of thc largest eMp whcu the concussion took placc?" kc., kc. " If 
I' tlic Russians arc uot able to build thcrc ~ C ~ d ~ ,  they will bc nblc to inanagc it in 
" thc Uiiitcrl Statcs. 
hi3 rcmrks  :- 
A-ore,itCer, 1 S 5 L  
" Thc Confcdcixtcs c i l~icd out esectly tIicsc suggertiona in thc ' Xcrrimac.' " 
c 2  
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20 TIIE ATTACK ASD DEFEXCE O F  FLEETS. 
calcdatc npou tlic ~~cccr. ;a~y rclocitj- with which tlic sliips uiurt ~ O Y C  to apply i t  in 
tlic w~iy tliat C:iptain l l n i ~ c y  proposw, p r t i cu ln r l~  if thc ship attacked is well 
:irincrl iind swift. I do not say that bj-and-byc wc sliall not comc to othcr iuodcs of 
i i b -  it j but uiidcr prc~cnt  circnmstanccs, I t1lin)i you c~ii icrcr dcpcud with niocli 
ccrt2nty upon it in a gencnl action. ~ h c n ,  again, I 110 not tliink wc s1in11 ~iirvc many 
flcct nctions in tlic futurc. Tlic circumstanccs of fonncr wars, and the blocliacliug 
of gnt ports, madc it ~wccssary to havo n largc asscmbhp of ship3 to blocliadc 
them. Dot tlic ~r.Iiolc syrtcni ofnaval wadarc is now souttcrly cliangcd bT tlic iutro- 
cluction of d 1  thcsc ncn- modcs of attack, ncaforms ofrcsscls and gtins a d  torpedoes, 
t l u t  the nsscmblagc of flccts \rill bc unucccssarj, and thcrcforc i t  nil1 bc quitc :& 
rnrc chaocc, tlic fonnation of flccts. Our nttcntion ought to bc morc turncd to  
actions bclmccii tn-o or tlircc wsscls, or bctwccn sin& ~csscls, with tlic m n  and 
iritli the torpcdo rcsscls if you lilic. But I think i t  n-%l bc n most crtnordinary 
circum-etancc if two largc war flccts should c w r  mcct ngnin. 
Commaudcr tlic JIon. E. Dansos: Haring of h t c  year3 turncd ny nttcntion n 
good dcal tormrda thc inancrurring of flccts,and haring had opportunities of obscrr- 
IU,R tlic irnctical application of certain thcorics of flcct mnnacurring, I rcnturc t o  
offcr n kw rcmarks on tlic subject of tllc lccturc which wc liarc licartl this crclling. 
I n-ould rcfcr fiwt to c2iagnm G. I n  this diagram two flccts arc rcprcrcntcd qi-  
mxnchinx each other in linc abrcast. Captnh Colomb proposcc' that A shonld altcr 
t i s  coursc in order to aroid thc approac1i of13 end-on. mcorcticaUy, ccrtainlj, tlmt 
might nppmr pnctimblc; but I inaintaili t l n t  any one who has ECCII two flccts 
tipproacliing cadi otlicr cnd-on, l a c  that, would coneidcr A a bold mau if hc dtcrcd 
lus coursc a3 rcprceeiitcd in that cliagnm. 
Captain Comun : Arc you spcaliiug of r l iagrm G ?  
Commandcr E. DATSOS :Yes. 
Captain Comun : I do not rccommcnd that. 
Commndcr E. D~wsos  : That ~vould ap Iy equally to c l h p n i  7. If I \\'as 
placed in tlic position s1iovn iii tlic dkgrnni,% cannot tliink ~ i c  would cmr  ~ i a r c  t ~ i c  
boldness to malic' D signal to llis ships to  altcr his coursc einiultnncousl tostarboard, 
so as to  attack thc port wing aliip of thc cncmy ndmncing in linc atrcazt. If iic 
~ rc rc  to ndnncc in n linc in diicli  Captain Colomb lias originally placed A, I think 
IIC wroukl liarc a much bcttcr chancc of EUCCCSB. But I do not tliink nny manauvrc 
i3 pmcticablc within tho spacc of tlircc niinittcs, as dcscribcd in thc Iceturc. Ilnring 
tnh-cn tlic timcs of n great many manacurrcs, I do not think i t  possiblc that any flcct 
can makc any ~nanc ru~p~!  succcsslully undcr n t  lcaet fiftccn minutcr;. I do not think 
i t  would bc ndvisablc for anj ;idmirnl to makc n s ipnl  to attcmpt to do so. It could 
only bc donc bj prcrio113 undcrstnuding n-itli tlic Ciiptains of his sliips. Xcrt, as 
r c p l 3  tlic torpcdo, I think n t  prcecnt tlic torpcdo cannot bc an cflicicnt. 1rtap011 for 
rcsistiiig tlic attack of u. flcct or for nttnck. At tlic samc tiuic, I cannot but think 
that its pomr  will bc TCI*J much dcrcloped in fiiturc p r s .  A flcct nttacliing in 
linc ii1ic:id coi~ld not uec thc torpcdo to tlw same extent :IS R flcct attacking in linc 
abrcast. It is all very well to asiupc that a flcct in linc ahcad will pas3 through a 
flcct in linc nbrcnst. Tlic first ship may succccd in gctting tluough, but tlic ecccnd 
nr third ships woulcl stiind n grcat clinncc of bcing rmnmcd by tlic ship nearcst to 
tlicin ; and that ~roulcl not improbablythro\s- thc flcct iuto dieordcr. Tlic flcct in lino 
iibrcast would probably 11arc ships astern on cach wing, that \vodd opcl'3to up011 
tlic ships t h t  lm3  tluough. jVith rcferciicc to thc pelotoas or gron1is, tho pe2ootoiu 
appc~r in somc ways to bc n rcry good formation. refer four 
ship3 to tlircc. o n  two flccts ap roac~iing, sag onc in single colunin in finc ahead, 
nnd tlic ot~icr formed in groups &lotons) in lino ahca(1, you n1ay a.;sumc tlmt tho 
linc nhcatl \rill ottcmpt to pass nu onc sitlc or, and not throogli tlic groups, in which 
casc tlic argumcnt of Captain Coloinb would bc pcrfcctly correct, that oue ship's firc 
would bc lost, proridcd always tliosc ship3 licpt thcir stations correctly-. But. tliosc 
who h n ~ c  sccii flccts innnocurring cwn in )cacc tinic, will agrec n-itli mc that two 
Ship3 scldom liccp tlicir stations csactlj in  hnc nbrcast. It is very scklolu that it is 
possible to do SO ; and whcn you Iinrc the suiokc of an action, it is quitc impossible 
it cnn crcr bc donc. Equally so, I niay ELIT, inore io, v-itli n flcct formcd in onc 
column in linc nbrcast. Yon may lay it down in tlicory that tho ship that passes 
tl1r011gli tlic eoliiluu first will rcccire tlic fix of only two eliips j but, pnc t icay ,  slic 
!it tbc samc time, I 
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TIIE ATTACK ASD DEFESCE OF T?LCETS. 21 
rcccivo thc firc of ncarci- four, bcwusc thozo ships will not bo exactly iu linc 
abreast as thcynrc thcro dcscribcd in thc dingrani. A s  rcprcls thc torpcdocs, I tKuk 
prcscnt it --ill not bc pncticnblc to work n-itli tlieni; but in futum pars I nm 
coln-i!icctl wc ~l1:111 bc nblc to u s  tlicln iuucli nioro cicicutly tLin nt prcscnt ; that 
t l l g  will form a great obstaclc, and if not o s c a t  obstaclc, t l q -  will bc D dctcrrcut 
to two ships approncliing cadi otlicr 3lld trying t o  rnln cadi othcr, becaurc of the 
-. . 
that modesty d i c l i  is diic from sjuiiior nicinbcr of t1;;profcssioii. At. tlic f3nic t iinc 
I sllodd likc to crprcss tlint opinion which I kuow niany nicinbcr~ of tlic profcseioii 
clltcrtaiii, I nicnu tlic opinion d i r k  was cxprcsacd by Captain Dn\V%Oll that  tlrcre 
questions of thc day ~ l i ~ d d  bc nlorc thoroughly rcntilatcd, and put in 11osseslsion or 
tllc junior xncmbcrs of tlic profcsicn. A t  tlic prcscnt momcut wc fccl o grcat maiiy 
c1ificnltics in that rcrpcct. Wc harc rcccirctl o wry ablc lcctiirc to-night from 
Captain Colorrib 011 “ ilcct mancrurriug.” mysclf how many timcs 
thcsc things 1i?rc occurrcd to most of us who arc working iu thc samc xrai, but, of 
COII~SC, n i th  inferior opportunities. WC niiah TCV much to  push forward, as far ns 
possible, thc profczsioii to wliich wc bclong. I may say that, bcing out with 
tllc combincd flccts thc otlicr day, wlicn thcy all asscniblcd for imnocurrce, the first 
qucstioii almost which rose to tllc lips of crcry OlIiccr who was on dcck, whcn they 
first e m -  that splcnc’lid array of diip3 on tho horizon, was, lion- should suck a col- 
lection of ships bc arangcd for attack or clcfcncc? I‘Fc u-crc prcsent during tlic 
~naiimnrrcs, which hstcd, for I am sorry l rc  wcrc oidy prceciit in tho dctachcd 
squadron, for onc d a ~ ;  but wo s m -  thosc iiiaiimurrc~9 during thc wholo of that t h c .  
Wc arc thoroughly imprcssctl with tlic importaiicc of thcsc questions bciug pushcd 
homc, and bcing thoroughlj rcntilatcd. \Vc unfortunatcly suffer to  o grcnt rrtciit 
from what Captain Dawson still morc fcrcibly put., tlic nmt of some institution or 
EONC fIncc wlicro tlicsc qucstions of a purcly naral cliarnctcr might bc discusscd. 
Sonict ling ha3 bccn said about tlic IIarrcy torpcdo. Captain Colomb hiinself said 
that thc IIarrcy torpcdo had sunk in his estimation. I think it did so mainly from 
tlic fact that cxpcrinicut had not bccn suflicicutly brought to bcar upoil thc point. 
I think, also, that thc country is cominittcd, to o grcat extent, to  mauy m h  eu- 
dearours for thc samc rcnson. Inrcutors sccm to think t l n t  it is sufficicnt for an 
inrcntiou to bc placcd bcforc thc country, for tho couutiy to takc it up ; that sucli 
an important mcasurc a3 thc wholc re-construction of our Xa~y,  wliicli mu adro- 
u t c d  tho 0 t h  day in thc Times, was to follow ixnmcdiatcly from it. Tlic most 
mli sclicmcs arc put forward in t h t  war. I inny mcution, baring bccu inimc- 
dintcly conncctcd with somc cxpcrimciits m t h  IIancy’s torpedo thc othcr d g  : 
t h t ,  in my opinion, on that particular occasion, it totally failcd. W c  wcrc a 
aliolc nltcnioon trxingto m u  o small  hi oud clid not succced, but Lid to go into 
liarbour with tllc torpcdo uiicrplodcd a t  tEb cnc\ of it. It was not, as many p i t l a -  
incn niiglit supposc, that .tho crror was on our sidc, bcmuso gunucry pcop!c liar1 
nothing to do with it: tlic cxpcrinicnt was cntirrly iu the Iiands of thc iunstcr of a 
tug, and I am surc no onc 1rou11d takc cxccption to his powers of Iiandling it. Bc 
tlmt as it mqr, E t i l l  011 tlm gcncml qucstioii of cxpcrimcuts xrc fccl tlint ~ r c  rcnlly M’C 
]~crrcrlcss in tlir iiintter. I wish positircly and particularlr to erprces tlic cmring 
for kno~rlclcdgc wliic!i cxirts among thc junior Ofliccrs of thc Xmy. Thcrc is not that 
npatlg a9 rcgartls tlicir profcision nliich many supposo to mist. Wc should only 
bc too happy to learn, but rcally TC hare no opportunity a t  tlic prcscnt day. Tlicrc 
arc crpcrimciits of envy naturc conclnctcd all round. In tlic sistcr scmicc, ns 
Captain Dairson said, tlierc arc institutions, tlicrc arc societies, and thcrc arc mcct- 
i n m i  n t  \rliicli all tlicsc qucstions arc discussed. I am EOW to that in tlic XnrT; 
d c ~ i  ouglit to bo our “first liiic of dcfeiicc;’ wc hare nothing of tlic sort. I do not 
incan to say t h i t  this Institution is not wry  Tduablc in its way, but beyond this 
Institution I tliiiik a socictc ought to exist sidc by sidc with it. I do not supposc 
any diflicidty is felt about tlic cristcncc of tlic Institution of R o p l  Enginccrs and 
tlic Royal Artillcry Institution. Tlicy arc TCT ralunblc to  tlie country. It appears 
to nic tlint Captain Colonib, in his lccturc 110s iiicrcly dcnlt n t h  tlic gcnernl qucstioii 
of “ flcct attacks {’ I think Iic sliould not incrcly do t lnt ,  but that lic should acccpt 
thc hq- as it is, and dcrclop D systcm of flcct attacks with tho Flcct ns it is. This 
I cmi hardly 
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21 TIIE ATTACK AXD DEFESCE OF FLEETS. 
point *trnck mc tlic otlicr day, riz., thc cxtraordinai? dircrsity of our ships. 31r. Rccd 
rpccially noticed tlmt point, and, I think, clcrcrlj slipped out of it, bccauso Iic said 
Iic could lcirc it to ’tlw intclligcncc aiitl ingenuity of British semen. That is tlic 
war tho autlioritics get out of tlic cliliiculty. The poitcrs of attack nnd dcfcncc 
posscscd by tlic Xarr of tho prcscnt ( 1 . i ~  arc so widcl~  dirersc tlint it  ir nlmost iin- 
-3i !a to study and derclop ilic pnrticular 1mtcrs of crcry ship. ‘I110 qucition of 
with cach  lip, d c ~ ~ n i i d s ,  ns.it wrc ,  (I ~pcch1 nnd particular stndy, EO that it is 
almost impossiblc to clcvelol1 a sptcin of tactics which i3 np licxblc to tlic Xav of 
thc prcscnt clay. 111 talking about tliir iuuattcr I harc met wityi, I will not s n ~  extra- 
ordinary opinions, bccausc I EIIOUICI bc very sorry to apply such a term to thc 
crprcsscd opinions of Oniccrs who nrc i n j  superiors ; but on’c Oniccr adrocatcd 
nttacking in tlic odc r  of pcloton, villi Hnrrey’s torpcclo on ‘cach quxtcr. All I can 
say is, that I sliould bc sorry to bc in tlic lending rcrsel of tlic pcloton, if flint i3 to  
be tlic sptcni of attack. I instancc that, becauec i t  show tlrc extraordinary crudc- 
ncs3 of o inion diicli  czists ercn in high circles on tlicsc innttcrs. I n v c c  with 
Cnptnin ~ a w s o n  that nftcr d i a t  ought to  11arc bccn twenty ycnrs of &fin& cxpcri- 
mcnt, we. shoidd l u rc  had tlic wholc thing nt our fingcrs’ cuds. I would jwt mcn- 
tion, pcrlinps I ought not to nicntion it hcrc,’tlint n t  Portsmoutli, at  our Xnral Scliool of 
Gnnncv, wc h a w  cndcarourcd to  cstnbli~li a littlc society intcndcd to supply tlicsc 
needs. W e  nicrcly incau to rcad a fca pnpcrs on professional subjects, nntl ~ ~ S C I I P R  
thcm, and so forth. I appcal rcry strongly to mcmbcra of my profession a110 may Lo 
prcscnt this crcning to  support sucli a morcnicnt, if thcF think i t  for tlic good of 
Captain RODERT SCOTT, R.S. : I mll only niention onc ortnopoiiit3 in conncctioii 
wit11 what Cnptnin Colomb lias said, 60 n3 not to tnkc II niueli of Four time, bccausc 
untilwo liarc got tlicrcsults ofact a n 1  cxpcrimcnts wit11 Jficrcnt sliipe, tlierc is a great 
ilcal of clillicilltj in dcciding upon the bcrt fornation for battle. dltliougli I eoncnr 
with much that Captain Colonib has slatcd in his valmblc pnpcr, I cannot concur in 
what hc E ~ J S  ns to tlic s ~ a l l  raluo of bow lirc. I bclicrc R powcrfd bow lirc will bc 
found to bc wry ndnntagcous, but until wc gct a diagnni showing tho actual 
nmount of crror in aiming nt tlic hull, nnd lion inany hits iiiight bc cqwctcd iii 
Terticnl lirc, nnd in firing domi iipon tlic uppcr dcck of a rcsscl (I bclicrc you will 
Iiaw gent  deal of plunging firc), you cannot nrrirc a t  a just conclusion. I n  pro- 
portion n3 Four guns nrc Inrgc, E-o will your shot bc clfcctirc. Wc know tlint cvcn 
nt a T C ~ J  smnll acute anglc, h c a v  stccl shot liittinn tho boa  would producc grcat 
effect, and if tlic point i3 arrcstcd by thc shot.’s h n g  in tlic nrmour, its hnso i3 
carricd forward, am1 tlic shot bccomc3 inorc pcrpcndiculnr to tlic platc as it continues 
t o  pcnctratc ; but to effcct complctc pcnctr:ition of thick arniour you rcquirc very 
11cav Eliot. I would sii$it that thcsc ~ I i o  aro ablc, nnd tlicrc nrc scrcid Oliiccrs 
prcscnt to-night wlio arc wcll ablc, should gct up tho subjcct of tlrc powrs of pcnc- 
tntion of tlic diffcrcnt giin3, togctlicr with a ilexription of thc ships, in ordcr 
t l in t  nll thc fact3 may bo laid bcforc thc Institution. I$ this Incans wc sliould 
attain to rcry conridcnblc knodcdgc of tho ruluc of thc iliflcrciit ship3 of our Fleet, 
and licncc bc cnnblcd to conic to a much bcttcr conclusion n3 to the modc of using 
it in nction than ~1-c an at  tlic prcscnt tinic. A s  thc Scliool of G ~ i n n c ~  113sbccn 
nUudcd to, I~~-oulcl remark that instczd of bchg a disadrantngc, it aould bc a rcry 
grcat adrantaw to tlic naral scrricc t.0 11nrc a placc wlicrc tlic youiigcr Oniccrr could 
asscmblc and &cuss tllcsc qucjt ioy .  Esccpt Captain Colomb tlicrc arc ns pt’only onc 
or two Oniccrs d o  liarc takcn up any of tho qucstion3 rclating to “ carnl tactics.” 
It would bc wry  ndmntagcons to the profcssion if EOli lC Oiliccr ~rould~lay out tlic 
models of thc iliffcrcnt ships licrc bcforc us, nnd then sliorr tlic rchtirc amount of 
kits that could bc anticipntcd both in boa  fir0 and in broadsidc firc; this \vdulrl 
enable all of u3 to arrivc a t ,  a niuck moro dcfinitc concln?ion rcspccting tlic TII~UC of 
tlic guns tlian i3 possible with our prcscnt liinitcd information. 
Coniiiianclcr Pusn-, R.S. : Captain Colomb hn3 statctl tlint thc TIarrcy torpcrlohas 
faUcn in liis cstimation. I EIIOUI~ likc to  di Captain Colomb, if tho British Flcct 
werc brought into action to-morroa against a Rus.&n Eqiindron in thc Daltic, and 
IIC wcrc Coiiimandcr-in.cI~cf, nndhc knew that cach of thc Itusinns oppositc to hiin 
sc rc  toning R coi~plc of toqicdoc3 n-lictlicr IIC ~ o u l d  fcd  Ilimzclf justified in taking 
go:- a lirc, of broadridc firc, of attack bj rnm, and of torpedo nttnck, in conncctioii 
thC F C ~ C C  to do EO. 
’ 
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tlic Ihitisli sqiindron into llic c l u ~ c  itctioii tlinL Iiu liaj spokcn of to-niglit? 3I‘y im- 
prcsion ie tlint if Iic did, ant1 tlic iron-clad Flcct calm to gricf, tlic Dritisli public 
~voidd stignintisc hiin ns tlic mm1crrrof our scnnicn. Xorc than that, although tlib 
Ikrvry torpcdo has bccn spokcii of sliglitingI~-, nntl lins bccn spoken of as bcing 
ton-cd astcni of rcsscls, yct in tlic cxpcriincnts Ilinvc r ~ r n  t r i d  with it, tlic torpcdocs 
IISW bccii on thc qiinrtcr of rcsds,  nnd a t  riglit nnglcs. I scc 110 rcnson d i y  thc 
IInrwy torpcdo, by incnns of slip ropcs, sliould not. bc towcd from the box3 of o 
ship. Xany of us lmrc bccn ton-cd in o cuttcr froni thcpncldle-bos ofa  stcnmcr,nnd 
pdmill j-  n-c 1inrc foiiiid o u r ~ l r c s  nbrcnst of tho pnd(llc-ivhccl. Wicrc i3 no rcasoii 
n-hy tlic IIamcy torpcdo slioiild not be towcd m l l  forward. In tlintcnsc I iunintnin 
tlint a rcsscl nmniing, or nttcmpting to nm, nnd missing hcr aim, n-ould ccrtninly 
come foul of tlic torpcdo, and irould tlwrcby conic to dcstruction. I nm only n 
junior mcinbcr of tlii3 Institiition ; bnL I offcr thcso rclnarka for thc considcrntion of 
thosc prcscnt, who, of coiirsc, w i l l  take tlicni for nhnt tlicy nrc worth. 
Cnptnin COLO~II :   think I uny gcncmlly nnarcr tlic criticisins on niy pnpcr in o 
f c s  n-ords. First of all, I hnrc rcstrictcd m p l f  to dcnling nit11 n-hat r c r c  EO far 
cstnblislicd as facts. I linrc cudcarourcd to deal nitli no fictions. Tliosc n-ho hnro 
rcnd my formcr pnpcrs on this subject d FCC tlint NF opinions harc rcv  niucli 
clmngcd, and I am quitc prcpnrcd that the s M l  chnngc n g i u  ns soon as n c r  f c t s  
nrc prcscntcd to my iioticc. I xisli it to t unc1crstooc1 that I takc a sort of im- 
pcrsonnl ricw of the question. I linrc bccu trying to  collcct such facts as arc 
obtninnblc, nnd to put them togctlicr, EO a3 to  fit thcm into E O ~ C  ~ o r t  of thcory of 
attack and drfcncc, d i i ch  iniglit sct iny brotlicr Ofliccr~’ niinrls inorc n t  r o rk  t lnn  
t h y  nre at  prcscnt. I harc not thc eliglitcst objcction, to UIC a nautical cxprcsjion, 
to “Coinc up nll I linic mid” a b u t  tho IInrrcr torpcdo ns soon 2s it i3 dill’crcnt 
from what it now is. Thc statc of the Hnrrc j  torpcdo ns i t  nt prcscnt csista is, that 
if it  csplodcs n t  tho n-atcr Iinc of nu iron-clad eliip it is hcld to bc nlinost hnrmlcsa. 
I f  it  is chnrgcd with dyiinmitc, or somc cxplosirc compound not yct cliscorcrcd, 
~dvhirli, on cx loding at  tho n-atcr-1ine;blows thc eidc of tho sliip in, tlic Ifnrrcy 
torpcdo rill !c rcry diffcrcnt from r h n t  it i 3  nor.  Tlicn it woiild rcquirc less skill 
to inaiiipuktc. Then, as n iiicmbcr mid, o flcct toring o uiimbcr of torpcdocs one 
on cncli quirtcr, ns lic dscribcs, n-odd bo wry macli mom &ugcrous t h n  it is 
nor. As the cnsc nt prcsclit gocs, if I n-cm ~t idd~nly  promoted, as has bccn sag- 
gcotcd, nnd wcrc put to attack o Ruseinn Flcct, I sliould, a3 far n3 I can scc a t  
prcscnt, nssumc tho formation in linc-nhcacl, mid go at him, trusting to chance for 
the rcst. At  nny ratc, only onc ship would bc blowi up thc first tuuc, to  s 3 ~  tho 
worst of it. I quitc a ~ c c  with tlic gcnernl cxpr~‘ssions wliicli linrc fnllcn from 
3Ir. Grcnfcll, Captain Darson, and Cnptnin Scott, nbout tli? ncccs~ity for cxpcri- 
mcnts. Dcnling with tho subjcct as I lrarc dcnlt with it licrc, I c?n only do it most 
impcrfcctly, bccnusc thcro arc f c r  espcrimcnts nnd fcw fwts to bc got.. Cnptnin 
Scott upholds bow fire on grounds ~ l l i c l i  arc, doubtlces, sntisfactory to him, and hc 
c1ccni.s i t  inucli inorc clcstructirc tlinn I do. 6cithcr of u s  .liarc any facts to go bT; 
i t  i3 simply inatter of opinion. If  I mere dcding with thc qucstion mysclf, tlic rcrv 
first thing I xrould do would bc to go to sca to nsccrtain w k t  the power of tlic bonf- 
firc nctunlly is. At  prcscnt we linre onlj- EOUlC data to tcll us t h t  from L sca-going 
ship firing nt nnothcr ship, broadside on, nt o thousand jnrds, oIi1y nbout tcn pcr 
ccnt. of tlic shot strikc. When xrc know tlmt that is tlic cEcct of shot nt R. fixcd 
clistancc, and tliat ~li ips moring, nrc nltcring tlio n n g c  100 ynd3 in 10 scconclr, i t  
FCCIIIS to me, oil tlic fncu of it, that without further cxpcrimcnts ‘‘bo\rfirc’’ cannot bc 
11cld cfl‘cctiw. Of coursc.it is harrlly rclcrnnt to thc pnpcr, still wc n-nnt rcry much 
inrlcccl tlio circulation of crcn such infomation ns is now to be got. It i3 most dilli- 
cult to gct information upon any point conncctcd, at nny ratc, witli~eubjccts such as 
ciplodc EOI~IC fcct nndcr watc; nnd then iE -i3 most forniidablc. I thiqk, tlkcforc, 
tlicrc must linrc bccn somc iniamanagcmcnt if it cxplodcd a t  thc rmtcr-line. 
Thc CII.\ICXAS : I hnrc no doubt that thc niccti~g nil1 depute me to rcturii 
our inpst gratcful tliaiiks to Captain Colomb for hi3 ra lublc  pnpcr. IIc h a  
frcouently come bcforc us on qucstions affecting our ow11 profession. I sliould rcry 
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iiiuch iiko to scc t1ies.1 expci.imcnta rwricd out. I was dcliglitcd to .lienr tkc spcc~li  
of thc gallant -joiing Officer (Licutcnnnt Qrcnfcll), nnd to learn tlist thc jiniior 
Oficrig nro starting D socicty nt Portsmouth for thc discussion of professional ~ u b -  
jccts. If i t  WI’C iiot EO Iato I should likc to h i - c  ash-ed him v-lictlicr, in tlic pro- 
jcctcd collcnc at Greenwicli, Iic tliiuks they will bc nblc to mrrj out all thcsc 
expcrinicnt~in tactics and wit11 tdrpcdocs, \rkic~i somc writers in t ~ i e  ~ i i i t e s  uggest 
dioiild be mndc in the TI:siiir3 ! I only hope that bcforc i t  is fiiinllg determined to 
citnblisli a S n T n l  College n t  Qrcciiwich, tlic dilniirnlty \rill dul~wcigli all tlic aclrmi- 
tqy3  wliicli Oniccrs, n.110 linrc stndicrl n t  Portsinontli, knrr found tlicrc. ‘llic 
collegc is in tlic doclqnrcl, wlirrc mosL of tlic new ships ran  bc srrn froin timo to  
tinir, and iicnr tlic “ Erecllcnt,” wlicrc 011r ginincry instrurtion nncl crprrinicnts arc 
rnrried on, nnd n-c arc tlicrc among many of oul! brother OBicers, both on shorr niitl 
nflont, with whom \re cnn discuss nard matters soincrrliat in  tlic Eamc mnniicr ns 
tlicro Ioung Oflicrrs propose to do ; thus wc llnrc mnn-j incniis of acquiring pro- 
fcaeionnl knowlcdgc, wkicli will clcnrly not bc nvailnblc at thc p r o p o d  Xnvnl 
Collcgc a t  Grccnnich. 
TIOLXES’S STOI’.M AXD DAXGEI1 .EIGSAL-LIGIIT. 
HOLMES’S “ STORN AXD DAXGER, SIGXAL-LIGHT.” 
By Ah. NATIIbrSIEL HOIJIfEP, Electrical En,’ ~lnecl’. 
AT this latc hour, I can do no more than bring bcforc you n short 
explanation of n now “ signal-light ” which mn-j- bc applied to many 
wry useful purposes in the Xnl-~ and also in the Army. Tho peculiar 
propertics of this “ signal-light ” arc,. tliabit is non-csplosiw ; it is not 
affcctcd by licat ; IOU may tlirom it into tho firo ; ~ o u  may melt the msc, 
but you will not injmc thc composition that is inside tlic casc. It is not 
nffcctcd by concussion; friction docs not in away damngc it. It is not 
affected byan~th ingbut  b-j- wntcr. If you throw it into water it bursts 
into flames tipontanconsly, and burns with n most brilliant light for n 
considcmblc lcngth of time. Tho small “ signal-light” n-hicli I hold in  
my Iiand, will burn for ncarly two hours ; it will givc n rery biillinnt lig?it 
for forty-firc minutcs, and neitlicr wind nor watcr will put it out. POY 
usc iu connection mitli marine purposcs I nccd hardly explain its many 
advantages. It is now adopted and in usc by thg Peninsular and 
Oriental Stcam Nn-igation Company; b~ tlic 3Icssagc:elics Maritimc Im- 
pcrialcs ; nnd by most of thc largo lines of dccp sen stcamcrs. The Royal 
National Lifc Boat Association haw also had somc of tlicsc “storm- 
signals ” supplicd to certain of tlicir stations for cqerimcnt. At sea i t  
will be found in~~luablc .  Supposc n man falls overboard, all that Iias 
to bc donc, is to takc n liiifc, cut thc top off thc pointed cnd of tlic 
casc, picrcc n liolc in tho end of tlic bottom tubc, throw tlic signal into 
tlic sea, when it inimcdintcly flxmcs up and marks thc spot idicrc tlic 
man lias fallcn, w-hilc the boat is being lomrcd, and tlic 1-esscl brought 
up in her course. If tho man can swim, hc snims to tlic light, and thc 
boat pulls to tlic light; it bccomcs thc rcndezvous wrhcrc to pick him 
up. That is one J-ery important usc of this “ signal-liglit ” at sea. By 
nicnns of it, tlic position of a ship’s boat in n dark and stormy night 
is nccuratcly ascertained, and tho fi-equcnt, tcdious, and ?t tirncs un- 
successful groping about for hours to find hcr, is woidcd. -1nci- 
dents of this kind arc of frcqnent occiwcncc. Another use at scn is 
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~ l i c r o  tlic light is placccl in IL small wvatcr mscrroir, and uscd about 
&ck as an opcn lantliorn for furling sails on a dark night, or for the 
purpose of lo\vcring O V C ~  the siclo of tho ship in cases of fouling nnclior- 
chains, accidcnts, or rcpairs, or at  thc iiiastkcod as :L “ flnsli-signal.” Tlic 
light a t  its inasimum is so intense, that it lnny bc scen for. tliirtccn 
linuticnl iiiilcs from R ship’s mast. Witli j-oiii* ~~crniission I will now 
ignite one of tlic lights, first esplaining its constriiction mil composi- 
tion; thc principlc of its sdf-ignition will then bc iindci.stood. 
Tho caso is composccl of n stout tin cj-lindcr 3 inchcs in diameter nnd 
4 inches high, from thc’lid of d ~ i c l i  R conical brass I~iiimcr projects, 
tlic pcrforntcd npcs of ivhich is lieimctically closcd bj- means of a 
soft mctnl-cap soldcrcd sccul-cly 011. Tllrough tho bottom of tho 
c~-lindcr, n mctnl tubc, 1 inch in cliamctcr, passcs into the intcrior of the 
case, to vitliin 4th inch of tlic uppcr lid, which carries the cone. The 
portion of thc tube witliin tlic cnrc is pcrfnrntcd with IioIcs, \vhilc tlic 
tnbc projects outside tllc cnsc 3i iiichcs. Tlio opcning at  the bottoin of 
the tube is likewise lieimctically sca ld  br a soft metal-cap. Tlic 
intcrior of tlic c$indcr surronnding tlic pcrforatcd tubc is fillccl wit11 
tlic chemical ingcdients. 
Tlic chcmicnl material contnincd insido tlic “signal-light,” consists of  
conimon chalk brokcn into slnall picccs about tlic sizc of bits of lump 
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2G JIOLJIES S STORM ASD DAXGCE SIGSM~-LIGIXT. 
sngar; tlicsc clialk-lnmps arc tlicn hcatcd to n wliitc licnt in a criiciblc 
containing R ccrtiiin proportion of phosphorus, wliicli being conrertctl 
into I-apour by tlic high temperatiwe, is absorbcd by tlic chalk when a t  
a whitc licat, much as n spoiigc absorbs watcr. Tlic chemical material 
this  f o i ~ c d  (pliosphtc of calcium) is, ~ l i c n  cool, plnccd in tlic signal- 
light-cnsc, niid tlic i~hole  soldci-cd down air-tight. 
All tliat is required to bc donc, whcn thc signal is nccdccl for use, 
is with ;I h i i fu  to cut off tho soft iuctal-top cuposing thc pcrfoixtion 
in tlic brass cone for thc cscapc of tlic gas, and by piercing the lower 
soft nictal cap, to makc an opening to admit 11-atcr into thc body 
of tlic casc. On placing tlic s i p d  in water, tho flamc immcdiatcly 
bnrsts forth, tho Iratcr coming into contact with the. clicrnicnl 
ingrcdicnt through tlio pcrforntioiis in tlic inner tubc. Tliis signal- 
light lias alrcatly bccn npprorcd of bj- thc Board of Trado for us0 a t  
sea, as a snbstitutc for bluc-lights and port-fires, and sonic cspciimcnts 
Iia\-c rcccntly bccn made by Nr. Thomas Gray, tlic Sccretnrj- of thc 
Alnrinc Department of tlic Board of T’radc, with n ticw of nsccrtaining 
how far tho light could bc cniployecl in C ~ S C S  of shipwreck as a mcam 
of assisting tlic rockctdinc-nppnratus, by being prqjcctcd in tlic form 
of a shcll from tlic ordinary 5i-incli mortar. Tlicsc csperiments, 
susg.cstcd by Xr. T. G r a ~ ,  wcro quitc sncccssful, tlic signal light bcing 
uninjured by tho pcrcussion, aiid blazing ni\-ay on ihlling into tlic 
watei.. I place on thc tablc thc form of tlic light and shell to bc 
cmployxl for projection into tlic sea from tlic 5+-incli mortar; the two 
cxtrcniitics of tlic case nro of coursc picrccd bcforc it is fired from tho 
mortar. 
Thc third form of tho ‘‘ signnl-li&t ” on tho table is,’ onc to bc nscd 
as a pomcrful flash and dangcr-signal for lifeboat scrviecs; it is con- 
trivcd to produco a vcry powerful liglit for a shortcr lcngtli of timc; it 
burns foi. fiftccn minutes or morc. This modification of tlic sigual is 
mndc, as it  has bccu somctimcs urgcd as an objection, that it buim too 
long, and cannot bc cxtinguished. In this form tlicrc is a larger 
surfhc of tlic clicmical matcrialcxposed to tho wntcr a t  tlic snmc timc, 
more gas is thercforc &-en  on; and joii obtain n briglitcr flame; but it 
burns for n, shortcr period. 
Xi.. Holmcs thcn oshibitcd tlic modc of using tlic lights; two signal. 
lights were sclcctcd, tlin tops cut off, and opcuings mndc in tlic bottom. 
Onc  as plnngcd undcr v-atcr, the other \\-as floatcrl on tlic surface, nntl 
tlic moment thc irntcr came in contact with tho compositiou, n brilliant 
flaiiic burst forth from cncli sigpal, and contiuncd to burn for n long 
period with increasing intensity. I n  tlio cnso of thc signal undcr Katcr 
tlic finmo rosc to tho surfacc, not in n continnous stream, but in a suc- 
cession of gulps as it wcrc, while tlic light from tlic signal on tlic snrfacc 
of tlic water burncd iritli tlic steadiness nnd forcc of a strong gai flame. 
Thc only d r n ~ b a c k  to tlic rxpcrimcnt in tlic room IWS tlic quantity 
of mpour which tho lights cmittcd diiring bnrning. At scn this is 
considercd nn advaatngc, from thc smokc bcing illuminatccl by the flame 
and seen at an immcnsc distancc. 
. I  
Lhhnird RYDEE : n o a  long  doc^ tho htter form of signal light biirii ? 
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IIOL3lES'S STORjL ASD DASGEP. SIGSAL-LIGHT. 27 
3h. I I o L l r E J  : Tlic flnttcr form burns nbout fiftccn minutc~ with an intcnscly 
briglit light. I n~ay stntc that this signal light Ins bccn takcn into custody trice;  
ollcc nf Inrcrncss last Jul-r, wlicn it mas exliihited bcforc tllc Railway Clenring 
Irollsc ofichlz, and onrc a t  lhi$~ton, ahcn  it was rsliibitcd bcfore tlic Einpcror of 
tile 13mzil3, tlic Coast Guard thinking it to  be n aignnl for somc i l l rg l  1>urposc.  
Cnptnin Wmxs,  R.N. : Doc3 damp injurc the light ? 
?,IF. IIOLIIES : Xo, tlic casc i3 pcrfcctly air-tight, nnd water-tight. 
Captain C O L O ~ I ,  R.S. : About tho atorngc on board ship 3 
Xr. ITO~XEB : Tlicrc is no daugcr, and bcsidcs thew i+ littlo llcnt in the flanic ; i t  
Captain Co~oun :But if through dninp it caught firc! 
Jrr. IEOLXEB : I t  cannot catch firc from damp. I f  it bcconics dnmp fou nil1 pcr- 
Sothin: but wntcr will sct it nlight. Dmnpncs will 
is warm, but tlicro is not rcry much hcnt. 
ccirc n disapccablc odour. 
only dccoinl;ox tIic inntcrinl. 
- - 
Cantain \VILLES : 110% nbout it if i t  is in a liot dnnlp climatc for six lnontlis 7 
31;. IIOLXES : TIIC grcatcr tlio lieat, tlio safcr thc stirage of thc light. T ~ I C  damp 
d not nliicct it. some of tlicsc lights 1 have kept undcr water thrcc niontlia; 
tlicy nrc n l l  csrcfillly tcstcd b:foro tlicy nrc packcd, nnrl scnt out from tho rorks. 
Admiral RYDEE : IYlrat is tlic intensity of tho light as mcasurctl by gas ca~~dlce  ? 
JIr. HOLXES : It i3 considcrcd to  be about thirtccn timcs thc illuniinatinn powcr of 
o rd ia ry  strcct gas ; but I must confcss to n littlc ipomncc upon tlic prccL rchtiro 
illuminating poircr, for I linrc bccn so busy tlint I 1iarc not lint1 time to comparc 
it with morc tlian tlic ordinary bluc light n t  n rnilc and a half. This light has bccn 
burncd and tlic blue light l m 3  bccn burncd a t  the saiiic distance. Tlic cornpnrison 
bctwccn tlicni is rciuartablc. In a ship~rrcck, JOU ohcn cannot light your bluc 
light from damp and mtcr ,  but nitlr this s i p d  light yon arc indcpcndcnt of tho 
ECD nnsliing owr Four boat : tlic inoro watcr, tlic niorc light ; it is incstinguishnblc 
as wc hnvc sccn by watcr, nnd wind rannot put it ont, though it iuay partial$ 
scpantc tlic continnity of thc flainc. Witli rcgrd to  tlic cspc~lgc, I consdcr thc 
cs )cncc of tliiqliglit to bo onc-half tlic cspcnsc of bluc lighte, aliicli arc about 148. 
n-Aozc-n; thc pricc of thcsc liglitj is Gr. cncli; but tlicn from onc signal-light you 
obtnin D bcttcr light, wliicli n-ill bum for 45 niinutce, and lisvo n li<lit indcpcndcnt 
of watcr mshiig orcr it. I qucstion ahctlicr tho aliolc dozcn bluo ligliti n-ould 
burn for45 minutcs; ecrtainlynot if thcy get wct. This light 113s bccn tricd n t  
Sliocburpw, under tlic dircction of JIr. Thomas Grnj-, and fircrl out to rca, n 
distancc of nbout 510 jnrdq, from a 6f-inch mortar, with clinrgcs of 3: nud 4 ounccs 
of powder, to scc if concussion would dcstro>- the igniting powcr of thc light. 
A T'ISITOC: Has tlic light btcn uscd as n fl:l3hilIg signal I 
Brr. HOLYES: KO, it 113s only a t  prcscnt bccn ndoptcd by tho Peninsular and 
Oricntnl CoiiilnnF, and othcr important lines of dccp SCD stcnmcre ; but I mnsidcr, 
wiicn it bccomcs bcttcr kno\ni, tlint it  d l  prorc to  bc inralmblc for ccrtnin pur- 
poses conncctcd with Karal nnd JIilitnry tactics; for instnncc, n3 a signal light for 
tlic protcction of torpcdo lincs,dicn flnshcd by3 rcflcctor across tlic rangc ; for dc- 
ccinng nn ciicmy a t  night by fnlrc signals ; for discorering n-hat is bcing donc nndcr 
co-icr of ChrknCS3 by nn cncniy's bonts, by projccting thcsc liglite into their position; 
for protccting n sliorc or h t t c r r  from Eurpriec at night, by nicnns of thcir illunii- 
nnting powcy; €or targct pracLo nt niwlit; for marking tlio position n t  niglit of 
buoys, and for laying donii torpcdo-bcar&w a t  Night ; mid foy nll othcr such pur- 
poses ulicncrcr 3 powerful light is rcquircz out of doors, siniplc, portable, and frco 
from dangcr in transit. For niilitarj purposes it miy with 'equal adrantagcs bc 
npplicd to pontoon-bridgc building, trcnclr work, fortification dcfcncci, camp cquip- 
mcnte, Iiorsc pickcting, and flash ~igna13 for spccid mnnacurrc3, nnd nlso for 
balloon signnl~ ; it3 citrciuc liglitncss nnd sccurity cnabling nny nnd crcry soldier to 
carry onc or inorc whcn cngagcd upoii slwcial scrricc. For sliipnrcck it is cqually 
nscful. Tlircc or four tlwomi upon tlic FCR will illuniinatc thc surrounding darli- 
ness, and cnablo tho shorc rcscuc partics to clircct tlicir cndcaronrs in tho most 
pncticnl maiiner. At such tinies tlic vnluc of a brilliant incstinguisliablo light is 
brjond belief j it mcans tho ssring of mniiy lirc3. 
'fie t h n k s  of thc inccting x'icrc thcn votcd to 3Ir. IIolinca for cxliibiting and 
explaining his signal-lights. 
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